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RETHINKING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
A SLIGHTLY DICEY BUSINESS
H. W. ARTHURS*
I.

INTRODUCTION
Between the "Rule of Law" and what is called "administrative law" (happily there

is no English name for it) there is the sharpest possible contrast. One is substantially the opposite of the other.'

While almost no one today shares Lord Hewart's phobic reluctance to
pronounce "administrative law" except in quotation marks, and while almost
everyone is prepared to concede to administrative tribunals at least the
minimal legitimacy accorded to all facts of life, there seems to persist an
attitude that law and administration are indeed opposites. Law is regarded
as an unqualified good; its Rule is perceived as a constitutional imperative.
It follows that administration should be accepted only with reluctance and
to the extent that it conforms to Law and abjures its own true, but intrinsically wicked, instincts.
This attitude, understandably, is rarely encountered in the corridors of
power where public policies are conceived and shaped, and the dubious joys
of modem administration are celebrated. But it is endemic amongst politicians when they speak for public consumption, lawyers who have to contend
@ Copyright, 1979, H. W. Arthurs.

* Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
I have been much helped by three research assistants, Robin MacRae, Pepita Capriolo,
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Lewis, Geoffrey Wilson, and Jeffrey Jowell. None of the above, however, are responsible
for my own errors and heresies.
I Hewart, The New Despotism (reprint 1929 ed. London: Ernest Benn, 1945) at 37.
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with government on behalf of individual clients, powerful interests who view
law as a potentially tighter rein than politics with which to check an unruly
administration, and judges who are the oracles and instruments of the Rule
of Law. And the attitude is found as well amongst less exalted, perhaps more
disinterested, individuals: ordinary folk who have silently suffered official
arbitrariness, editorial writers and law reformers who wish to strike a blow
for virtue, and academic critics for whom the bloom is off the roses of the
welfare state and administrative regulation of the economy.
This essay is an attempt to explore the supposed opposition between
the Rule of Law and administrative law, to suggest that there are more
accurate ways of perceiving administrative law within our legal system, and
to propose a new framework within which to define the proper limits of
administrative action.
At the threshold of such an attempt, it may be useful to provide working definitions of the concepts around which the discussion will revolve.
The notion of a "legal system" is central. While, no doubt, other definitions might be advanced, the term is here used, in Friedman's phrase, to
describe "the living law of a society," as opposed to its formal or ostensible
law. 2 Friedman suggests that a legal system combines three elements: "structural" components--"the moving parts... of the machine," such as courts,
legislatures, administrators, and policemen; "substantive" components"what the judges.., say and do," statutes, and administrative rulings; and
"culture"--the public attitudes and values which determine "the way the
legal system fits into the culture of the general society."8 As a preliminary
matter, this definition will serve at least to give notice that the discussion
which follows will not be confined to an analysis of legal doctrine.
It is important, secondly, to identify what is meant by "administrative
law." As will be seen, the term had a very specific meaning for Lord Hewart.
However, the more general meaning intended to be conveyed in this context
is that administrative law relates to the legal arrangements affecting administrative decision making. These include such questions as the constitutional
legitimacy of administrative tribunals, their design and method of operation,
the substantive results of their activity, and their relationship to the general
legal system. Necessarily, the last issue, which embraces judicial review, will
be a major topic of analysis.
Third, discussion will focus on administrative "tribunals" rather than
the other administrative arrangements for conducting public business. Farmer
has demonstrated the difficulty of defining "tribunals" in such a way as to
include the infinite variety of forms of administrative decision making which
exhibit a sufficient cluster of relevant characteristics, 4 yet to exclude courts.
However, his particular enumeration of characteristics reflects the special
2 Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development (1969), 4 Law & Soc. 29 at 34.

3 Friedman, On Legal Development (1969), 4 Rutgers L. Rev. 11 at 27-29.
Farmer, Tribunals and Government (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974)
at 184-85.
4
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experience of England, 5 and thus suffers from the same drawbacks as the
American term "administrative agency," which also has a special, culturebound significance. To avoid confusion, "tribunal" will here be used to refer
to any body with a statutory mandate to decide disputes or to regulate activity. However, it will also include some bodies whose mandate is not statutory
(such as arbitrators) or whose statutory mandate is more broadly defined
(for example, to include investigation or mediation) if such bodies sufficiently
resemble "tribunals" in ways relevant to the analysis on some particular
point.
These working definitions of "legal system," "administrative law" and
"tribunal" are proposed only in order to facilitate discussion. It is clear that
they may not be sufficiently precise, without further qualification or exposition, to sustain detailed analysis on any given point. This leads to a final
threshold observation. The analysis which follows is in fact phrased in
nonspecific language; the ideas expressed are meant to reside at a level of
moderate abstraction. But a pervasive assumption of this essay is that language and ideas in administrative law should be given a concrete and specific
form which responds to their actual social, political and economic context.
Indeed, it will be argued that failure to do so has been a prime source of
mischief and misunderstanding. And there is no better illustration of the
perils of excessive generalization than discussion of that large-looming constitutional premise of administrative law-the Rule of Law.
II.

WHICH "RULE OF LAW"?
The Rule of Law has been metaphorically described as a "bridle for
Leviathan." 6 This evocative phrase has, however, been conceded to embrace
at least three distinct meanings. The first, discussed below, purportedly rooted
in nineteenth century British constitutional principles, stresses the role of
the courts in defining and defending individual rights. 7 The second focuses
upon guarantees of procedural fairness.8 And the third assumes that government and law are subject to "the restraints of an axiology deriving its validity
from human reason, nature, or God" 9-in effect, to limitations of "natural
law." Other, more sophisticated, definitions have been advanced. 10 Moreover, the Rule of Law is also often used as a mere rhetorical device, a vague
ideal by contrast with which legislation, official action, or the assertion of
private power is mysteriously measured and found wanting. It is therefore
necessary to give a more precise meaning to the Rule of Law if we are to
know what Lord Hewart believed administrative law to be opposed to.
5For example, Farmer, id. at 186, refers to the requirement of a public hearing,
to the necessity of giving reasons upon timely demand, and to the availability of appeals
on questions of law, as characteristic of "tribunals." All of these, however, result from
the specific modem legislative framework of tribunals in England.
6
Harvey, The Rule of Law in Historical Perspective (1961), 59 Mich. L. Rev.
487 at 491.
7 Id.at 491 ff., esp. at 493-94.
8 Id.at 494-96.
9
1 d. at 496 ff., esp. at 499.
1
0See, e.g., Burin, The Theory of the Rule of Law and the Structure of the Constitutional State (1966), 15 Am. U.L. Rev. 313.
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Lord Hewart did use "the Rule of Law" as a term of art, explicitly

adopting"1 Dicey's definition, the first of those referred to above. It is, therefore, upon Dicey's work12 that this analysis will focus. To adopt this focus,
it must be conceded, is to belabour a horse which is thought to have died
so long ago, after assaults so numerous and savage,1 3 that humane considerations might dictate another line of investigation. It is, for example, forty
years since Frankfurter wrote:
Few law books in modem times have had an influence comparable to that produced by the brilliant obfuscation of Dicey's The Law of the Constitution....
Generations of judges and lawyers were brought up in the mental climate of
Dicey. Judgments, speeches in the House of Commons, letters to The Times,
reflected and perpetuated Dicey's misconceptions and myopia. The persistence of
the misdirection that Dicey had given to the development of administrative law
strikingly proves the elder Huxley's observation that many a theory survives
long after its brains are knocked out. 14

Yet Frankfurter's remarks might have been written today. While Dicey
may have failed to persuade some of his more astute contemporaries," partially revised his own views late in life,16 suffered posthumous embarrassment
at the hands of his spiritual heir-Frankfurter refers to Lord Hewart's attempt
to "give fresh life to the moribund unrealities of Dicey by garnishing them
with alarm"1 7-and may now be read through the sepia filter of a generous
editorial introduction,' 8 he is still very much a presence. In debates over the
relationship of the courts to the administration, the Rule of Law remains the
rallying-cry for those who favour judicial intervention.
11 Supra note 1,at 24 ff.
12 Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (London: Macmillan, 1885). Reference
will be made to the 10th ed., 1959, E. C. S. Wade, editor (repr. 1965).
13 See, e.g., Davis, Discretionary Justice (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1971) at 30 ff.; Friedmann, The State and the Rule of Law in a Mixed Economy (London:
Stevens, 1971) at 75 ff.; Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty (1958),
106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 943; Heuston, Essays in ConstitutionalLaw (2d ed. London: Stevens,
1964) at 41 ff.; Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th ed. London: University
of London Press, 1961) at 55 ff. and 238 ff.; Landis, Administrative Policies and the
Courts (1935), 47 Yale L.J. 519; Willis, Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The
Judicial, The Conceptual and the Functional (1935), 1 U. Toronto LJ. 53.
14 Frankfurter, Foreword to Discussion of Current Developments in Administrative
Law (1938), 47 Yale L.. 515 at 517.
15 Maitland, for example, in his Constitutional History of England (Reprint 1908
ed. Cambridge: University Press, 1955) at 526 ff., makes several references to "administrative law" in nineteenth century legal literature, although finally concluding, at 536,
"that the line between the constitutional and the administrative departments [of law] is
one which it is very hard to draw." Cf. his somewhat nostalgic references to changes in
local government and administration in 'The Shallows and Silences of Real Life"
(1888), in Fisher ed., 1 The Collected Papersof F.W. Maitland (Cambridge: University
Press, 1911) at 467. The earliest article on the subject listed in the Index to Legal
Periodicals was Goodnow, Administrative Law (1893), 1 Univ. L. Rev. 105. Generally,
however, Dicey's book was well-received upon publication. It received short but favourable reviews in legal periodicals: see (1885), 79 L.T. 440 and (1885), 20 L.J 766; and
a second edition was published within six months of the first: See Preface to Second
Edition (1886).
16Dicey, The Development of Administrative Law in England (1915), 31 L.Q.
Rev. 148.
17 Frankfurter, supra note 14, at 517.
18 Wade, supra note 12, Introduction, esp. at xxx ff.
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Dicey's analysis was sufficiently compelling to dominate the very terms
of reference of the first major modem study of English administrative law,
the Committee on Ministers' Powers, in 1932,19 and thus ultimately (so his
editor contends) 20 to shape the Franks Report 2 ' and the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958.22 In Canada, the McRuer Report, in 1968, rejected as
"unwarranted" criticism of the Rule of Law based on the admitted fact that
Dicey's statement of the Rule of Law "was not completely accurate as applied
to the English Legal System in his own time," because "Dicey himself recognized that his statement was not intended as a statement of universal truth,
but rather as a general principle or an ideal objective."u The McRuer Report,
in its own words, then made recommendations "to reinforce the Rule of
Law by appropriate legal safeguards," 24 recommendations which were the
basis of an entire generation of "reforming" statutes both in Ontario2 5 and
in other Canadian jurisdictions,
force.

27

2

and which by no means have spent their

And Dicey's Rule of Law has, without doubt, influenced judicial and

professional perceptions of administrative law. Its influence has perhaps not
always operated with constant force in Canada, England, or other countries
with British-derived legal systems, nor equally upon all judges and lawyers
at any given moment. But whatever else the Rule of Law may be-whether
legal rule, constitutional principle, or pious aspiration-it has become a
legal-cultural artifact. It has an emotive and symbolic significance, and still

commands loyalty to which, on any objective assessment of its intellectual
merits, it is not entitled. It is an issue which must be addressed.
What, then, are its components? The '28
Rule of Law embraces "at least
three distinct though kindred conceptions.
19 Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (Cmd. 4060, 1932). Robson, in
Justice and Administrative Law (3d ed. London: Stevens, 1951) at 423, says that because the Committee's terms of reference required it to determine whether administrative
decision making violated the "rule of law," it "started life with the dead hand of Dicey
lying frozen on its neck."
2
o Supra note 12, at xxi and xxix-xxx.
21Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Public Inquires
(FranksReport) (Cmnd. 218, 1957).
22 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 66, now Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1971, c. 62 (U.K.).
23 Ont. 1 First Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights (McRuer
Report) (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1968) at 58.
24 Id. at 59.
25 The Statutory Powers Procedures Act, S.O. 1971, c. 47; The Judicial Review
Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 48; The Public Inquiries Act, S.O. 1971, c. 49; The Civil
Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1971, c. 50 (the latter amending scores of
statutes from The Abandoned Orchards Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 1 to The Woodsmen's Employment Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 503); and The Judicature Amendment Act, S.O. 1971,
c. 57.
26 See, e.g., Federal Court Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1, now R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.)
c. 10 (amending 34 statutes, although not all of them were in relation to matters of
administrative law); Judicial Review ProceduresAct, S.B.C. 1976, c. 25.
27 See, e.g., Can. Law Reform Commission, Federal Court Judicial Review (Working Paper No. 18) (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1977).
28
Supra note 12, at 188.
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First, no one "can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except
for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before
the ordinary courts of the land." It is important to note Dicey's double
emphasis. He insists both upon the exclusive legitimacy of law-later qualified as "regular law" 29-which he contrasts with "wide, arbitrary, or discretionary power of constraint," and upon the adjudicative monopoly of the
"ordinary courts of the land," which he then juxtaposes with "persons in
30
authority.)
Second, the Rule of Law implies not only that no man is above the
law but "(what is a different thing)" that every man "whatever be his rank
or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals."'' 3 In this formulation, the same double
emphasis appears: the emphasis upon "the ordinary law" and (lest the
reference to "ordinary tribunals" be misconstrued) upon what he reiterates
are "the ordinary law courts,532 in contradistinction to French "administrative tribunals" to which "there can be with us nothing... corresponding."38
Third, the general principles of the constitution-at least those, says
his editor, relating to the protection of private rights34-are "the result of
judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases
brought before the courts ....',35 As he later explains, these cases are determined by "the ordinary law of the land."3 6 Again, the dual emphasis upon the
"ordinary courts" and the "ordinary law" is clear.
Much criticism of Dicey, as has already been suggested, is fueled by
his obvious misdescription of both English law and other systems with which
it is contrasted. He has been rightly criticized for failing to acknowledge the
existence, even in 1885, of many other tribunals beside the "ordinary courts,"8' 7
for ignoring the extensive immunities from "ordinary law" of various public
officials, 38 for misstating the principles and practice of both English 0 and
French 40 administrative law, and for slighting the contribution to constitu29

Id. at 202.

0

s Id.at 188.
31 Id. at 193.
2 Id. at 202.
38 Id.at 203.
84 Id. at 195, n. 3.
85 Id.at 195.
861d. at 203.
87 Jennings, supra note 13, at 55; Wade, supra note 12, at cxvi. See also Parris,

Constitutional Bureaucracy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969) at 258-66, for a more
general attack on Dicey's understanding of nineteenth century history.
3
8sJennings, supra note 13, at 238; Friedmann, supra note 13, at 75.
3

9Jennings, lc. cit; Wade, supra note 12, at cxxiv.

40

See Stone, The Twentieth Century Administrative Explosion and After (1964),
52 Cal. L. Rev. at 529; Friedmann, supra note 13, at 76; Wade, supra note 12, at cxiv.
Cf. Mitchell, The Causes and Effects of the Absence of a System of Public Law in the
United Kingdom [1965] Pub. L. 95.
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tional law of Parliament itself.41 No doubt further criticisms of this sort can
be made. 42 Nor are these criticisms deflected by the ingenious defence of
Dicey's work as prescription rather than description. 43 He himself well under44
stood the difference, as he showed in his criticism of Blackstone.
When all of the criticisms of Dicey are given appropriate weight, however, and his particular defence of the Rule of Law is seen to be untenable,
one must still come to grips with the essence of the doctrine itself.
The intensity of the belief that the ordinary courts are supreme and the
ordinary law all-pervasive is not now wholly, or even primarily, attributable
to Dicey's dubious dissertation. 45 It is shared even by many who scorn Dicey's
Whiggish antipathy to all forms of administrative regulation.4 6 It has become
imbedded in the very vocabulary of administrative law, and is a central feature of the traditional conceptual basis of judicial review. Administrative
tribunals are "inferior" tribunals; the ordinary courts are "superior." Tribunals must act "judicially": the essentials, if not each particular, of the
procedure of ordinary courts epitomizes the duty. Tribunals must act intra
vires: the vires to which they must conform are defined by the ordinary laws
of the land. And tribunals may not shelter securely behind clauses which seek
to oust the supervisory jurisdiction of the ordinary courts: these clauses are
frequently disregarded as a matter of presumption, interpretation, public
policy, or constitutional principle.
Thus, although other versions of the Rule of Law might be more defensible, and certainly more sophisticated, 47 it is Dicey's version which presents the issue naked and unadorned: are ordinary laws and ordinary courts
the opposite of, and must they prevail over, administrative or other norms
and forums?
41 Fuchs,

Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory

(1938), 47 Yale LJ. 538 at 558.
421 have completed research on, but not yet published, a series of studies which
suggest that in nineteenth century England adjudication in forums other than "the ordinary courts" according to rules other than "the ordinary law" was both widespread and
well recognized. The reader is requested to accept my findings, summarized infra, tentatively and subject to revision when published in final form.
43
Supra note 23. But what is one to make of Heuston's observation that Dicey
often encapsulated the "Rule of Law" in quotation marks, supra note 13, at n. 13?
44
Supra note 12, at 11: "We have all learnt from Blackstone .. .to make such
constant use of expressions which we know not to be strictly true to fact, that we cannot
say for certain what is the exact relation between the facts of constitutional government
and the more or less artificial phraseology under which they are concealed. .. "
45
Holdsworth, for example, confers both a lengthy pedigree and the weight of his
own reputation upon Dicey's "classic exposition" of the Rule of Law. See Goodhart &
Hanbury, eds., Holdsworth, 14 History of English Law (London: Methuen, 1964) at
198, 4201
ff.
8

See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 13, at 94-95; Stone, supra note 40, at 526-27;
Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927) at 203 ff. Dicey described himself as a Whig,
and recognized the formative influence on his own political views of those of his father,
a Whig journalist. See "Autobiographical Fragment" in Rait, ed., Memorials of A. V.
Dicey (London: Macmillan, 1925) at 5.
47 See esp. Unger, Law in Modern Society (London: Free Press, 1976) at 193 ff.
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Ill. THE RULE OF WHICH LAW?
Dicey's egregious emphasis upon "ordinary courts" and "ordinary law"
raises significant questions about their opposites, about the relationship of
ordinary to "non-ordinary" courts and laws, and thus about the internal
geography of our legal system. Where does law come from if it is not ordinary
law, and what legitimacy does it enjoy? If administrative tribunals (and arbitrators and domestic tribunals) are not applying ordinary law, what norms
are they applying, and why should these be subordinated to the rules of
ordinary law? If, as Dicey suggests, a characteristic of ordinary law is its
universal applicability, to what degree do other kinds of law lean towards
special treatment, and why? and do ordinary courts always apply ordinary
law, or do they sometimes apply other norms? and do nonordinary tribunals
ever apply ordinary law?
To anticipate the answers to these questions, I suggest that application
of the label "ordinary" is conclusory and not descriptive, that the sources,
content and processes of law are infinite and various, and that in our highly
pluralistic legal system, the rule of "ordinary law" is generally as much the
result of inertia as of policy, at best a mid-Victorian anomaly stranded between earlier centuries of special jurisdictions and the modem fashion of
administrative adjudication.
A.

What is "Ordinary Law"?

Resolution of the general question "what is law?" is beyond the scope
of this inquiry. However, to the extent that the Rule of Law, with its emphasis
on "ordinary law," is to be understood and applied, some sort of working
definition of law is obviously necessary.
Dicey himself provides little assistance. In the context of his discussion
of parliamentary sovereignty, he does define law as "any rule which will be
enforced by the courts,"48 but this definition is of little assistance in the context of a discussion of the Rule of Law even if it is assumed that "law" is
synonymous with "ordinary law."
In the first place, it invites formulistic compliance. Many statutes now
require the courts to enforce the decisions of other tribunals (leaving open,
it is true, in some cases, the possibility of challenge in separate review or
appeal proceedings). If this simple expedient converts into law rules which
would otherwise not be law, the Rule of Law means little indeed. Second,
as Goodhart points out,49 Dicey's definition excludes all rules, no matter how
obligatory, if they are not enforced by the courts. At the level of practicality,
it is difficult to distinguish the impact of such rules from the impact of what
Dicey would call law. At the level of principle, the definition also creates
difficulties. For example, a single statute may lay down a body of rules, some
of which are assigned to a court and some to a tribunal for enforcement; the
former would be "law" according to Dicey, the latter not. To deny the status
48
49

Supra note 12, at 40.
Goodhart, supra note 13, at 953.
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of "law" to rules which are enforced elsewhere than in courts thus creates
unreal and unjustifiable distinctions. Third, if rules which are not enforced
in courts are not law, the courts are, ironically, deprived of the right to50 scrutinize decisions of other tribunals for noncompliance with such rules. The
Rule of Law, apparently, will not stoop to conquer.
If scrutiny of the bare words of Dicey's definition holds out little prospect of enlightenment, only marginally more is to be gleaned from exegesis
on his text.
That Dicey intended "ordinary law" to include common law, "judge51
made" law, is clear from his extended discussion of civil liberties. It should
be noted, indeed, that Dicey had a special affection for common law because
it was relatively free from contamination by the "collectivist" impulses of
modem legislation. 52 But, putting aside preferment on political grounds, did
Dicey intend that "judge-made" law should be coextensive with "ordinary"
law or only a part of it?
Surprisingly, this is not a question Dicey addresses squarely, although
the answer is inevitable and easily inferred. Dicey certainly considered that
"ordinary" law should embrace not only common law but at least some
statutes as well. 53 Statutes, after all, are at least to some extent included in
the definition of law as "rules which will be enforced by the courts," and
at least one statute is referred to with approval in his discussion of personal
freedom. 54 But, primarily it is in Dicey's espousal of parliamentary sovereignty that the legitimacy of legislation as "ordinary law" appears: "The
55
sovereignty of Parliament favours the supremacy of the law of the land."
Given this affinity between the Rule of Law and parliamentary sovereignty,56 it is difficult to see how a statute, the tangible result of the exercise
by parliament of its sovereignty, could not be law or, for that matter, "ordinary law," in conformity with the Rule of Law. Nonetheless, it seems clear
that Dicey could not have believed that all statutes conformed to the Rule
of Law merely by virtue of parliamentary enactment.
Dicey himself invites us to distinguish amongst various types of statutes.
He remarks that Austin's analysis of law is based upon "a typical law,
50 Cf. Mitchell, supra note 40, at 113 ff.
51 Supra note 12, cc. 5-7.
52 Dicey, Law and Public Opinion in England, during the Nineteenth Century
(London: Macmillan, 1905). Reference will be made to the 2d ed., 1914, E. C. S. Wade,

editor (republished 1962).

53 Dicey makes no reference to privately adopted rules, customs, or administrative
practices, as "legal' rules, although he would almost certainly regard them as non-law.
These sources will be dealt with infra.
54 The Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, referred to supra note 12, at 216. Dicey also
refers, without specification, to "other enactments protecting the liberty of the subject."
Id. at 204.
55 Id. at 406.
5
6 Dicey assures us that the two are neither "in opposition" nor "counter-balancing

forces." Id.
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namely, an English criminal statute. ' 57 Presumably, such a "typical" law is
also part of Dicey's "ordinary law," but it is doubtful whether criminal
statutes are, at least today, either "typical" or "ordinary." Without entering
on the controversy of whether English judges retain a vestigial jurisdiction
to create new offences, it is generally true that legislation has preempted the
common law in the area of crime. This fact argues for different treatment of
criminal statutes than might be desirable in those areas of private law where
legislation is both relatively rare and deliberately designed to overturn or
amend a common law rule. But modern administrative statutes resemble
neither criminal nor private law legislation. They are, typically, designed to
regulate an area of complex social or economic activity; almost inevitably,
they require considerable public expenditure and ongoing administrative
intervention; and they are intended to be either internally self-sufficient or
not, as Dicey puts it, to maintain
part of a scheme of related statutes, but
"the logic or the symmetry of the law." 0
It is fair to speculate that administrative statutes would not be regarded
as "ordinary law" by Dicey. As will be seen, they may be impugned on the
specific grounds that they confer unwarranted discretion, lack universality
of application, or depend upon noncurial enforcement, but any such attack
would necessarily involve the peculiar conclusion that a law passed by a
sovereign parliament does not conform to the Rule of Law.
The speculation is well-founded; Dicey did not shrink from such a
conclusion. In Law and Public Opinion, as late as 1914,0 he condemned at
least a half-century of "collectivist" legislation because it failed to conform
to his unrevised criteria of "ordinary law." Statutes attracted his censure
because they assigned adjudicative tasks to administrative tribunals which
"always tend to exclude the jurisdiction of the ordinary law Courts," 0 0 or
exhibited "unjust favouritism"'6 in exempting from ordinary tort liability
one group of persons (trade unions), thus reducing the universal applicability
of legal rules, or conferred wide "power of subordinate legislation," 0" so that
some law other than ordinary law would apply.
These criticisms, it is true, were encapsulated within a more general and
political attack on "collectivism" and were not expressly framed in terms of
violations of the Rule of Law. 3 Nonetheless, they show that Dicey did not
accept the possibility that new notions of what is "ordinary" law might have
overtaken his views on the Rule of Law. The statutes he criticizes were not
atypical; on the contrary, they were as he concedes,04 in the mainstream of
57

Supra note 12, at 72.
58 Supra note 52, at 364.
59 Introduction to the second edition, supra note 52.
o ld. at xliii.
1Ild. at xlviii.
62 1d. at xl.

63 Curiously, the "Rule of Law" does not appear in the Index to Law and Public
Opinion, is not discussed as a separate theme, and is raised only inferentially in the
passages referred to in the Introduction to the Second Edition, supra note 52.
o4 Supra note 52, at xxx-xxxi.
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modem social legislation; nor has there been any reversion to supposed
earlier forms down to the present time. 5
A theory that stigmatizes twenty, fifty, a hundred years of legislation on
the grounds of departure from "the ordinary law" and "the ordinary courts"
is, to say the least, open to criticism.68 A theory that seems to assume that
reflect it, can
legal principles should determine social reality, rather than
'6 7
fairly be characterized as "the narrowest type of legalism.
Nor is Dicey's view of "ordinary law" open to criticism on the sole
ground that it inflexibly fails to respond to new developments. Perhaps more
seriously, it lacks even the sustaining virtue of historical accuracy.
Dicey believed that "a large part, and, as many would add, the best
part of the law of England is judge-made law.... ,,68 In the context in which
this assertion is made, it is clear that the "judge-made law" to which Dicey
referred is the law of the superior courts, and especially common law and
equity. It is impossible to compare quantitatively or qualitatively the law
emanating from the superior courts with that enacted by Parliament, but on
at least two counts, Dicey's position is open to attack.
First, it reflects the then prevailing, but erroneous, view that the central
courts exercised a virtual adjudicative monopoly, 9 and that they controlled
what they did not actually decide. 70 To the extent that it was at all true that
the superior courts occupied such a central position in the English legal
system, this "truth" prevailed only briefly and anomalously for a few decades
in the mid-nineteenth century. Until that time, by far the greatest number of
cases, both civil and criminal, were decided in courts of local and special
jurisdiction. 71
65 Dicey himself subsequently appeared to accept the availability of judicial review
as an adequate compromise between the Rule of Law and the evident need for administrative adjudication, supra note 16. This has been the solution adopted as well by Rule
of Law-minded legislators, see supra notes 22, 25 and 26. However, it will be argued,
infra, that neither the means nor the ends of judicial review are appropriate controls
upon administrative activity.
66 The point is made amusingly in Cavers, Review of Smith, Government by Commissions (1938), 47 Yale L.J. 675. at 677-78: [Smith] finds that [administrative commissions] 'are daily being more and more given over to the arbitrary management and
control of the properties and liberties of every Englishman.... The property and person
of every man are subject to harrassment and vexation by unlimited and invariable
to hear and determine [causes] by
powers given to such Commissions to proceed ...
The future of a nation which failed to heed this counsel, which
their discretion' ....
persisted in the subversion of its fundamental law and institutions by continuing or,
still worse, extending the powers of commissions and thus the centralization of national
government and executive power, would seem to be a gloomy one. Yet there is comfort
for those who fear for Britain. Mr. Smith's polemic was published in 1849.
67 Robson, supra note 19, at xiii.
08 Supra note 52 at 361.
09 See, e.g., Holdsworth, supra note 45, vol. I, at 188.
70 d. vol. xiv, at 182-83.
71See note 42, supra. My (unpublished) description of the English legal system
in 1830 shows, inter alia, that some fifty of the most active local civil courts had a
collective caseload approximately three times that of the Westminster Courts. The maximum jurisdiction of these courts was generally either £2 or £5, but this was a substantial sum at the time. On the criminal side, it is conceded that the local justices
decided almost all cases except the most serious, see Holdsworth, supra note 69.
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Many of these courts enjoyed a clear mandate to decide cases according
to rules other than those of common law and equity: the customs of manors,
merchants or mining communities; broad-gauge principles of equity and good
conscience; or statutory standards enacted to regulate some field of social
or economic activity. In addition, they employed procedures quite unknown
to the superior courts: mediation, inquisition, summary pleading, oral testimony by the parties, lay advocacy and decision making, and adjudication
by community consensus, to name but a few. Nor was there any right of
appeal from most of these courts.72 On the contrary, some of the busiest
courts were expressly insulated from judicial review by privative clauses in
their charters or constitutent statutes. When a right of appeal existed in
theory73 from courts such as the lower criminal courts, which purported to
dispense justice according to common law or general legislation, the right
was not only circumscribed by law, but often virtually unexercisable for
practical reasons. The law of the superior courts, then, was not, in any
meaningful sense, the "ordinary law" which ruled the life of ordinary people,
at least until the suppression of local jurisdictions beginning around 1830.
Even putting to one side these very active, but "nonordinary," courts,
much of the important adjudicative business of the country was conducted
by tribunals which did not adhere to "judge-made law." In many important
sectors of the economy, disputes were characteristically submitted to a private
tribunal for arbitration. In some cases, perhaps, lawyers were employed as
arbitrators and "ordinary law" was thus likely to be applied in the making
of decisions. But to a far greater extent, arbitrators were not selected for
their legal knowledge but rather for their familiarity with the customs of a
particular trade or industry, and they decided cases accordingly.
The contest of trade custom with common law, and of informal dispute
resolution with formal court procedures, was an ancient one, and did not
end with Lord Mansfield's effort to incorporate the law merchant into the
common law. On the contrary, it persisted at a formal level until at least the
1870's when strenuous efforts were made to persuade Parliament to establish
Tribunals of Commerce staffed wholly or largely by lay judges, and mandated
to decide cases according to commercial custom. When this effort failed,
arbitration still continued to attract so much support that the "ordinary
courts" were obliged to radically alter their procedures in order to compete.
And still arbitration flourished, in preference to recourse to "ordinary law."
Mention must be made, as well, of the plethora of tribunals and commissions charged with the administration of regulatory statutes. By the eighteenth century, the old mercantile system had, of course, declined, although
72

Appeals were generally expressly foreclosed by the many statutes establishing
lower civil courts, and by statutes such as the Factories Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Win. 4,
c. 103, s. 42 (U.K.), which created new "public welfare" offences. While prerogative
writ proceedings were, in theory, available to challenge certain errors in the lower
courts, their full potential had not yet emerged by 1850.
73
A general statute providing for appeals on questions of law in criminal cases was
enacted only in 1857: Summary Proceedings Before Justices of the Peace Act, 1857,

20 &21 Vict., c. 43, s. 2 (U.K.)
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until the 1830's local justices continued to more or less administer a wide
range of both national and local laws regulating many matters. Beginning
74
at an earlier date, but especially from the 1830's onwards, and long before
75
adjudicaextensive
1865-70)
in
Dicey,
(pace
the advent of "collectivism"
tive responsibilities had been assigned to such bodies as the factory inspectorate, the Board of Trade and the Inclosure Commissioners. Their responsibilities were not to decide cases according to "judge-made law" or "ordinary
law," but to execute the policies laid down by an active, reforming Parliament. As Jennings reminds us,
[A]dministrative courts are as "ordinary" as the civil courts. There is no more
reason for calling them extraordinary than there is for calling the criminal courts

extraordinary ....76
Second, Dicey's quantitative (not to say qualitative) assessment of the
significance of "ordinary," "judge-made" law fails to take account of the
impact of law. It may or may not be true, as he says, that "[n]ine-tenths...
of the law of contract . . . are not to be discovered in any volume of the
statutes, '77 but this is not to dispute that the remaining one-tenth may be the
fraction which impinges most significantly on the lives of most people. Statutory regulation of the terms of employment and the price of bread ended
only with the triumph of laissez-faire in the early nineteenth century, and
comparable incursions into contractual "freedom" occurred with regularity
again from the time of the first Factory Act onwards. No doubt most of the
law of property was "judge-made" and "ordinary" in Dicey's sense (although
local, customary, copyhold tenure was common at least until the 1830's)
but profound effects for vast numbers of property holders flowed from the
special statutes authorizing sewers or enclosures. How many people, after all,
inhabited the ill-defined but legally fertile territory lying between contracts
of guarantee and indemnity; how many entailed estates, so productive of
ordinary law and litigation in the ordinary courts, were left by mill operatives,
farmers, or domestic servants? And how many people effectively lay beyond
to touch
the reach of "ordinary law," "judge-made law," because it failed
78
the problems with which they were most urgently concerned?
In summary, Dicey's assumption that recourse to "ordinary law" and
74
See, e.g., Jennings, Wade and Parris, supra note 37; Roberts, Victorian Origins
of the British Welfare State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960); and Brebner,

Laissez Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth Century Britain (1948), 8 J.Econ.
Hist. (supp. viii) at 59.

75 Supra note 52, at 64, and Lectures VII and VIII, passim.
70
Supra note 13, Appendix II, at 313. Indeed, perhaps it was the justices of the
peace, sanctified as they may have been by ancient constitutional lineage, who were
more nearly "extraordinary", and who were "persons in authority [exercising] wide,
arbitrary, or discretionary powers of constraint" (Dicey, supra note 12, at 188), see
generally Webb and Webb, English Local Government from the Revolution to the
Municipal CorporationsAct: The Parish and the County (London: Longmans, Green,
1906) and, for the early nineteenth century especially, Thompson, The Making of the
English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977) passim.
77
78

Supra note 52, at 362.

This is not to deny that they needed, and were involved in, law. But it was not
"ordinary law" in Dicey's sense; it was local law and, increasingly, administrative law.
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"ordinary courts" was a constitutional right sanctified by actual practice in
"pre-collectivist" England is insupportable. On the contrary, history and
modem practice coalesce around the proposition that what is "ordinary"
is a situation in which law emanates from many sources, including judges
who do not sit in, and are not part of the hierarchy of, the superior courts;
statutes which perversely and persistently fail to conform to Dicey's constitutional strictures; and customs and private arrangements which similarly
sink below Dicey's plimsoll line. In short, Dicey's view of the legal system-in
the sense of Friedman's definition-was both partial and partisan: partial,
because it ignored so much; partisan, because it emphasized the legitimacy
of the common law over all other parts of the system.
B.

Making Law "Ordinary"

From the undeniable fact that so much of law is not "ordinary" in
Dicey's sense, there are three possibilities of escape. First, the term might
be abandoned as meaningless, with all that such a step would imply for the
traditional view that certain values, rules and institutions are central and
controlling in our legal system. This is, in fact, the position which will ultimately be urged. Second, the term might be expanded to embrace all rules
and all tribunals. This is no different from abandonment. The sole reason
for describing things as "ordinary" is to draw lines, to distinguish what is
"ordinary" from what is not. If everything is included within the category,
the exercise loses its point. Third, the "ordinary" courts (in Dicey's sense)
might be said to have the power to domesticate deviant rules and systems,
to make them "ordinary" by adoption. This process, which, within limits, is
implied by the Rule of Law and the practice of judicial review, is a form of
alchemy but, unlike the mediaeval art which sought to convert common
substances into rare ones, judicial review seeks to reshape unusual laws and
tribunals into "ordinary" ones. Nonetheless, it was the approach favoured
by Dicey.
It is possible to envisage this process at two levels: the review of a
"deviant" system as a whole, or an attack upon particular features of it in
the context of a challenge to some individual act or decision.
There are relatively few examples of direct, general attempts to suppress
or transform systems which are not "ordinary" in Dicey's sense. However,
several may be cited: the enforced primacy of "ordinary" law over customary
law, both domestic 79 and colonial;80 the insistence that arbitrators adhere to
"ordinary" law and the denial of the right of parties to contract for an idiosyncratic legal regime;81 and, in the special situation of Canada's written
constitution, the attempt to prohibit arrangements for adjudication by tribunals which are neither superior courts, nor amenable to their reviewing
79
See, e.g., Tedeschi, Custom and Modern Law (1977), 15 W. Ont. L. Rev. 1,
esp. at 11ff.
80 See Hooker, Legal Pluralism-An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial
Laws (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), cc. 2, 3 and 9.
81 See note 42, supra. This development is described in an essay on commercial
disputes in the nineteenth century. See also Czarnikow v. Roth, Schmidt, 11922] 2 K.B.
478 (C.A.).
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jurisdiction.8 2 In none of these cases, however, were the courts invited to
suppress systems which were based upon validly enacted legislation. Rather,
in the first two instances, they largely relied upon legislation to attack private
or customary legal systems. 88 In the third, it has sometimes been held that
statutes establishing the impugned administrative systems were beyond provincial competence, but never that there is an enforceable right of access to
the "ordinary" courts, or of a decision according to the principles of "ordinary" law.8 4 Thus all three attempts to secure conformity to the Rule of Law
stopped short of a direct confrontation with the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty.
Dicey himself holds out no hope for the triumph of the Rule of Law
in the event of such a confrontation. Indeed, his benign insistence on the
complementary qualities of the two doctrines8 5 relieves him of the need to
pass definitively on the neat question of whether a judge can refuse to enforce
legislation that violates the Rule of Law. However, he does say that "[a]ny
Act of Parliament ...

will be obeyed by the courts,"8 6 and later buttresses

this observation by restrictively defining the innovative mandate of the courts:
"Judicial legislation is

. .

. subordinate legislation, carried on with the assent

and subject to the supervision of Parliament.187

On the other hand, excessive deference to the preeminence of Parliament would lead to obvious difficulties in enforcing the Rule of Law. If the
courts were simply to obey statutes, and to confine their own law-making
activities to situations where Parliament's "assent" and "supervision" could
fairly be implied, how could they fail to give effect to "collectivist" or other
incursions upon ordinary courts and ordinary law?
But Dicey did not intend that judges should be so self-effacing. He well
understood that judicial innovation "represents in truth a peculiar cross-8
current of opinion, which may . . . modify the effects of [legislation].11
Judges, he noted, are much more concerned than Parliament to maintain
"the logic or the symmetry of the law," 89 to secure "certainty" rather than
amend the "deficiencies" of the law, 0 and may entertain "ideas of expediency
or policy [which] . . . differ considerably from the ideas which . . . guide
8

2 The controversy is conveniently captured in Hogg, Is JudicialReview of Administrative Action Guaranteed by the British North America Act? (1976), 54 Can. B.
Rev. 716.
83 The suppression of domestic customary law was essentially a common law
development. Colonial customary law was made subservient to local reception statutes,
while the Arbitration Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 49 (U.K.) in allowing courts to require
an arbitrator to state a case, provided the necessary mechanism for ensuring the rule
of "ordinary" law and courts.
84 This position was closely approached by Lederman, The Independence of the
Judiciary (1956), 34 Can. B. Rev. 769 and 1139, at 1174.
85 Supra note 12, at 406.
86 ld. at 40.

87 Id.at 60-61.
88 Supra note 52, at 369-70.
89 Id. at 364.
90 Id. at 366.
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parliamentary legislation." 9' Each of these features has a potentially inhibiting effect upon statutes which require sharp departures from "ordinary" law,
especially by establishing nonjudicial tribunals armed with discretionary
powers to vindicate legislative policies.
In some fields, no doubt, this "cross-current" of judicial opinion has
as its source the exercise by judges of an original jurisdiction at common law
or equity.92 Far more controversial are the situations where judicial views
are channelled into the exercise of interpreting legislation, and particularly of
reviewing the activities of noncurial tribunals. It is in this latter context that
the problem must be confronted of whether statutes, especially those which
give birth to administrative tribunals, can in fact be accommodated within
any meaningful definition of "ordinary" law or courts.
For example, it might be thought that if a statute confers adjudicative
powers upon "persons in authority" (Dicey's phrase) rather than upon
judges, it must necessarily offend the Rule of Law. But a judge has no power
to strike down the statute on this ground alone, and if the grant of adjudicative powers is unequivocally clear, what can he do but enforce it? And, if
he does, does it not become "law" notwithstanding that it reduces access
to the courts?
From this particular paradox, Dicey indeed sought to escape, at first
by a dubious exception for forces majeures,93 ultimately by the broader concession that "it becomes almost .inevitable that jurisdiction [to adjudicate]
should be given to a department of the Government, or to officials. '0 4 However, for Dicey the "inevitable" approaches the brink of unconstitutionality:
Such transference of authority saps the foundation of that rule of law which has
been for generations a leading feature of the English Constitution. But we must
remember that when the State undertakes the management of business.., the Government... will be found to need that freedom of action necessarily possessed
by every private person in the management of his own personal concerns .... 05

It is ultimately retrieved only by "the fact that the ordinary law courts can
deal with any actual
and provable breach of the law committed by a servant
96
of the Crown."
But is this retrieval at all? What is at issue is not breach of the law,
but rather conduct which, though in compliance with the law, breaches the
Rule of Law. Holdsworth's gloss upon Dicey seems more nearly to resolve
the paradox:
[Un so far as the jurisdiction of the court is ousted, and officials are given a purely
administrative discretion over questions of a justiciable kind, the rule of law is
91 Id. at 367.
92

Id. at 371 ff.
In The Law of the Constitution, supra, note 12, Dicey concedes that in extraordinary circumstances government may require "[the] occasional use of arbitrary
authority" (at 411) which, however, "must always be exercised under Act of Parliament... [and] under the supervision ... of the Courts" (at 413).
94
Supra note 16, at 150.
93

9

5 Id.

96Id. at 152.
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abrogated. But I do not think it is abrogated if these officials are given judicial
and quasi-judicial powers. No doubt these powers are not exercised by the courts;
but because their exercise is strictly controlled by the
courts, it is true to say
97
that the principle of the rule of law is not infringed.
Yet even Holdsworth ultimately reaches an impasse. If the courts are precluded by legislation from reviewing administrative decisions, the legislation
98
-while "law"--will have violated the principle of the Rule of Law.
To sum up this line of analysis: Parliament is sovereign and its statutes
are part of the "ordinary law"; however, it is not so sovereign that it can
immunize certain statutes from being stigmatized as "not ordinary" and in
violation of constitutional principle; but those statutes, notwithstanding,
are still "law."""
A lesser concern for paradox and a greater preoccupation with practicality brings us to a second difficulty in reconciling the concept of "ordinary
law" with legislation. Dicey's views about the place of common law in our
system have already been quoted: he believed judge-made law to be both
the largest and "best" part of the law. 100 He would, undoubtedly, have agreed
with Lord Scarman's later formulation that statute law is essentially "an
exception to, a graft upon, or a correction of, the customary law."' 0 ' But as
Dicey himself had demonstrated in Law and Public Opinion, there is a considerable ideological component to both statute and judge-made law. How
then, for example, in Dicey's terms, is a "collectivist" statute to be read in
association with an "individualistic" rule of common law?

[TIhe judges [Dicey says] who are influenced by the feelings of magistrates no
less than than by the general spirit of the common law, are disposed to construe
statutory exceptions to common law principles in a mode which would not commend itself either to a body of officials, or to the Houses of Parliament, if the
Houses were called upon to interpret their own enactments .... 102

Dicey implies that judges deliberately revise the expression of parliamentary will-a "collectivist" will-in order to preserve the "individualist"
values of the common law. Thus stated, the exercise is clearly recognizable
as an act of constitutional overreaching confined, it is true, to occasions of
interpretation and then only to marginal occasions; but it is overreaching
nonetheless. Yet it is by this same process that law is made "ordinary," that
97 Holdsworth, supra note 45, vol. XIV, at 203.

98M. at 202-03.
It is difficult, however, to interpret Dicey's views of the constitutional limits of
parliamentary sovereignty: "Every one ... knows as a matter of common sense that,
whatever lawyers may say, the sovereign power of Parliament is not unlimited ...
There are many enactments, and these laws not in themselves obviously unwise or tyrannical, which Parliament never would and (to speak plainly) never could pass." Supra
note 12, at 71. The limits, he says, are both external-the possibility of widespread disobedience-and internal-the character of the government, which is formed by the prevailing sentiments of a society. Id. at 76-85. These mysterious speculations are most
significant as a forewarning of Dicey's own later advocacy of civil disobedience and
virtual insurrection on behalf of the Ulster Unionists, see Heuston, supra note 13, at 2-3.
'OOSupra note 68.
101 Scarman, English Law-The New Dimension (The 1974 Hamlyn Lecture)
(London: Stevens, 1974) at 3.
102 Supra note 12, at 402-03.
99
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the Rule of Law is made to prevail over nonconforming legislation. While
Dicey does not describe this process of interpretation-cum-revision in any
detail, it is a familiar one.
The occasion for interpretation may arise in several ways: the court may
have been given primary jurisdiction to administer the statute; it may be
reviewing the interpretation of some other, noncurial decision-maker; or
it may encounter the problem of interpretation as a collateral issue while
it is in the course of performing other functions, such as deciding an ordinary
common law action. Arguably, the court's attitude to interpretation should
vary depending upon the occasion. If the court is exercising primary jurisdiction, it can at least be said that Parliament has put itself in the judges'
hands, and accepted the risk that their common law attitudes will permeate
interpretation. If the court is exercising a reviewing jurisdiction over an administrative tribunal, for example, it might well advert to the fact that
Parliament chose to place its faith in the interpretative skills and sympathies
of that tribunal rather than those of a court, a presumption strengthened by
the presence of a privative clause. It might be expected that the reviewing
court would therefore exhibit considerable diffidence about imposing its own
interpretative views. This expectation should, if anything, be heightened
when the question of interpretation arises collaterally. 08 Then the court is
neither charged with primary responsibility nor exercising a residual jurisdiction to prevent "error"; it tends to be on unfamiliar ground; and it sees
the issue of interpretation in a context in which it does not usually arise.
However, the occasion for interpretation seldom affects the court's views
of its function. It is relatively rare for a judge to explore, or defer to, accepted
administrative interpretations, or to seek to inform himself of the general
context and operation of a statute before applying it.
Indeed, the refusal of judges to use extrinsic aids to interpretation is a
separate concern of considerable importance. By insisting that the search for
meaning be confined within the four corners of the statute, courts are overtly
serving notice, as Dicey says, that they do not care whether the interpretation
adopted is one which would "commend itself to either a body of officials, or
to the Houses of Parliament."' 1 4 Placing this view in perhaps a better light
than it deserves, the judge's professional commitment to principles which
promote symmetry and consistency in interpretation are given priority over
Parliament's desire to accomplish the purposes of the statute. A less charitable hypothesis is that courts are anxious not to know what the statute really
was intended to accomplish so that they can choose from amongst the possible interpretations the one which most closely coincides with "the spirit of
the common law," social policies which it embodies or which they espouse,
or the equities of the particular situation. A third hypothesis, with a genuine
practical basis, is that the difficulties of sifting and weighing extrinsic evidence
103 "Collateral" application would occur, for example, when a regulatory statute
which provides its own administrative remedies is used to define the standard of conduct
expected of the defendant in a tort action. This use of the statute is "collateral" in the
sense that the judge does not purport to be directly applying the statute, jurisdiction to
do so having been assigned to an administrative tribunal.
104 Supra note 102.
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may exceed the potential gain in understanding. Other historical and constitutional explanations have also been given. 1 5
I suggest, however, that rules against the use of extrinsic aids to interpretation are part of the general impulse to make law "ordinary." Such rules,
after all, also exclude parole evidence in the interpretation of contracts and,
effectively, evidence of custom. What is being guarded against, it would seem,
is the emergence of special legal rules applying only to a particular sector of
activity regulated by statute, a relationship governed by tacit and informal
understandings, or a trade or industry with its own system of customary law.
Those who are the custodians of "ordinary law" have every reason to be
wary of special legal vocabularies. The very existence of such vocabularies
is an important argument in favour of decision making by tribunals other
than the ordinary courts. It is instructive to recall that even Lord Mansfield's
diligent efforts to accommodate commercial custom and language within the
common law were not wholly successful: arbitration continued to flourish
at least partly because arbitrators could give effect to an entire regime of
special meanings more credibly than courts. And, on the administrative side,
the mid-nineteenth century experience of railway regulation points to a similar conclusion: a specialized tribunal was created to assume jurisdiction from
a court which had itself superseded administrative regulation, but could not
grasp either the terminology of the industry or its underlying realities.
It would be wrong to assume, however, that only a self-denying ordinance against the use of extrinsic aids prevents the courts from faithfully
executing Parliament's wishes. This rather naive view, surprisingly espoused
by Laski,'0 6 was rightly criticized by a contemporary author:
The remedy lies far deeper than a mere problem of words: what alone will satisfy
Professor Laski is a bench of judges whose 'inarticulate major premises' will
correspond with the very articulate major premises of Professor Laski . ...107

And so it is to the question of major premises that attention must be directed.
Obviously, the question of premises -

major or minor -

becomes im-

portant only where there is an exercise in deductive logic to be undertaken.
Where Parliament has made that task unnecessary by express and compelling
language the court need not make, cannot make, deductions. But it is in the
nature of much legislation that it should be framed in language which is
capable of sustaining more than one meaning, especially in relation to controversial or novel areas of public policy. Excessive specificity would heighten
partisanship, invite the making of neat distinctions and technical arguments,
confine the discretion needed to cope with unforeseen and unforeseeable contingencies. Breadth of language, with all its risks, is preferable. And it is in
the interpretative movement from broad language to specific applications,
through a process of deduction, that the choice of judicial premises becomes
critical.
To the extent that those premises are not explicitly articulated, they may
105

See, e.g., Kilgour, The Rule Against the Use of Legislative History: "Canon
of Construction or Counsel of Caution"? (1952), 30 Can. B. Rev. 769.
106 Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers, supra, note 19, Annex V.
107 Suzman, Administrative Law in England: A Study of the Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932), 18 Iowa L.R. 160, at 168.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.. 17, NO. I

sometimes be inferred from results. Without overstressing the point, it is
difficult to resist the inference that many common law judges did, and still
do, share Dicey's antipathy to "collectivism" and his mistrust of administrative adjudication. 0 8 To a considerable extent, the interpretative premises of
judges dealing with statutes and administrative behaviour are demonstrated
by their choice of rules of interpretation. There are, for example, presumptions against taking away common law rights, against retroactivity, against
liability to tax, against denial of the right to be heard. There are the yin and
yang of expressia unius and ejusdem generis. Indeed there are, as Llewellyn

has demonstrated, 0 9 an infinity of rules and presumptions sufficient to sustain almost any interpretation, a conclusion that acquires ideological significance when, as Willis suggests," 0 the courts tend to develop particular interpretative approaches in different areas of legislative activity.
It is through the use of such presumptions and interpretative rules, some
of which are explicitly hostile to Parliament's intention, that judicial revision
of legislation takes place. A few illustrations will suffice. A regulatory statute
may inhibit the exercise of common law property rights; the relevant presumption may be used to grant immunity from regulation in marginal cases,
thus inviting challenge and evasion by those potentially regulated, and creating uncertainty about the regulatory scheme. The requirement of natural
justice may be read into a statute in such a way as to force the use of trialtype procedures of fact finding although, given the particular task at hand,
investigation or the use of official notice may be more appropriate. Or proscribed conduct for which there is no accepted generic term may have to be
listed in detail; this form of expression might well allow a court to interpret
the statute so as to exclude from proscription all other nonlisted conduct,
despite the fact that the mischief aimed at is not confined to conduct included
in the statutory list.
These familiar examples show how "ordinary" rules of interpretation
applied by ordinary courts can be made to prevail over, to revise and to
domesticate, special legal regimes established by statute. Attempts to impose restraints on this use of rules have proved no more successful that the
initial attempt to avoid the common law, its substantive doctrines, and its
adversarial procedures. Interpretations Acts are often ignored,"' broad grants
08

1

See, e.g., Jennings, supra note 13, at 252-53, 308.

109 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition-DecidingAppeals (Boston: Little,

Brown, 1960) Appendix C, Canons on Statutes.
11D Willis, Statute Interpretationin a Nutshell (1938), 16 Can. B. Rev. 1.
I E.g., the InterpretationAct, R.S.O. 1970, c. 225, s. 10 provides that "Every Act
shall be deemed remedial... and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal
construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the
Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit." This provision has a long history,
having first been enacted by the InterpretationAct, 1849, S.C. 12 Vict., c. 10, s, 5(28),
which in turn merely gave statutory force to the rule in Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co.
Rep. 7a, 75 E.R. 637. While no doubt the substance of the rule has been applied many
times-although by no means always, although it is the only such rule with legislative
sanction-the relevant provisions of the Interpretation Act were last noted judicially
almost fifty years ago, see Ontario Statute Annotations (Agincourt: Canada Law Book,
1974) at 313, Ontario Statute Citator (Agincourt: Canada Law Book, 1975 to 1978)
at 126-1.
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of administrative discretion are confined by imputed purposes,11 2 and even
privative clauses are sometimes brushed aside." 3
This is not to argue that all judges are always at odds with the legislature, or that those who are will necessarily seize each available interpretative
opportunity to blunt the thrust of regulatory statutes or administrative initiatives. Sometimes even judges conscientiously seeking to give full effect to a
legislative scheme will fail to do so. They may fail to discover the "true"

meaning of words because of legislative ambivalence or ambiguity in drafting.
They may be the prisoners of an analytical, intellectual style well suited to
the handling of individual, pathological problems but less sensitive to the
implications of systemic design and administration."14 Or they may quite
unconsciously apply the values implicit in the familiar work of common law
litigation, with its focus on private rights, in their less frequent encounters
with public or group interests." 5 Nor do I contend that all legislative draftsmen have demonstrated the necessary resolve, ingenuity and skill to minimize
the scope of judicial interpretation and revision. And least of all do I suggest that all administrative action purportedly taken under the aegis of a
statute would in fact be so regarded if, as Dicey said, "the Houses [of Parliament] were called upon to interpret their own enactments."
Given these qualifications and disclaimers, there still remain cases in
which judges apparently do conceive that their mandate entitles them to revise legislation through interpretation. Dicey had said that judges "are influenced by the feelings of magistrates," 1 6 and this "magisterial" impulse is the
source of difficulty. It is one thing to assert that judges are, ultimately, custo112The prohibition against the use of legislative history ensures that the purposes
will be "imputed," rather than accurately ascertained.
11

This is a peculiarly Canadian problem, and within Canada, a special problem

of labour relations legislation. The leading articles are collected in Arthurs, "The
Dullest Bill": Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia (1974), 9 U.B.C. L.
Rev. 280, at 327 n. 301.
114 See, e.g., Mitchell, The State of Public Law in the United Kingdom (1966),
15 I.C.L.Q. 133, at 146, quoted infra, text accompanying note 175. Cf. Miliangos v.
George Frank (Textiles), [1975] 3 All E.R. 801, per Lord Simon of Glaisdale, dissenting, at 824:
The instant appeal raises questions the answer to which imperatively demands the
contribution of expertise from far outside the law-on monetary theory, public
finance, international finance, commerce, industry, economics-for which judges
have no training and no special qualification merely by their aptitude for judicial
office.... An expert committee might be able to devise rules which were more
discriminating .... [Alt least the crucial decision would be taken in the light of
all the consequences involved. By contrast, the training and qualification of a
judge is to elucidate the problem immediately before him, so that its features
stand out in stereoscopic clarity. But the beam of light which so illuminates the
immediate scene seems to throw surrounding areas into greater obscurity; the
whole landscape is distorted to the view...
And see contra, Friedmann, Public and Private Law Thinking: The Need for Synthesis
(1959), 5 Wayne L. Rev. 291; Merryman, The Public Law-Private Law Distinction in
European and American Law (1968), 17 J.Publ. L. 3.
115 See, e.g., Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion (1938),
47 Yale L.J. 577, at 587-88; Mitchell, supra note 40, at 102, quoted infra, text accompanying note 172.
116 Supra note 102.
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dians of fundamental constitutional values, but it is quite another to concede that they are entitled, even at the margins, to make legislation conform
to the intellectual and socio-political premises of the common law, and to
force administrative decision making into the procrustean bed of common
law adjudication. For the latter manifestations of the magisterial impulse,
there is no mandate.
Conceding the need to vindicate the constitutional values referred to
above (but postponing the task of defining them), what approach to statutory
interpretation is preferable to that implied by the Rule of Law? An alternative
approach would begin with the hypothesis that our legal system is pluralistic,
that "ordinary" law is either undefinable or, if it is defined as common law,
it enjoys no preferred constitutional position. From this would flow several
propositions. First, statutes lead a life or their own, rather than a parasitic
and contingent existence within the body of the common law. Second, so far
as possible, they are to be enforced by judges in the spirit in which they were
enacted, rather than in "the general spirit of common law." Third, in the
event of conflict between a statute and a common law rule, the former should
prevail, if not on the ground of parliamentary sovereignty per se, then because
a statute which is later in time and more specific in intent is more likely to
integrate sensibly with contemporary legislation than a rule whose origins
are ancient and whose power is essentially analogical. And finally (but not
inevitably), for somewhat similar reasons, complex arrangements rooted in
private "statutes" such as contracts and club constitutions, and even anomalous clusters of common law rules which do not share its "general spirit,"
might be treated like legislation. In short, law should not be made "ordinary"
by interpretation.
IV. LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
Dicey's version of the Rule of Law, viewed as an ideal constitutional
framework, amounts to a prohibition against reconciling law with the imperatives of administration. Within the confines of his analysis, we can imagine
neither an effective administration which conforms to the Rule of Law, nor
a "lawful" administration which is effective. To be driven to a choice between
legality and effectiveness is intolerable but, as the following analysis will
suggest, happily not necessary.
Three connected themes, each of which will be canvassed, recur throughout Dicey's analysis. First, discretion is regarded as the antithesis of law. 117
Second, the generality of legal rules is identified as an important safeguard
of individual rights.118 Third, the resolution of disputes by the ordinary courts,

rather than "officials" or a Conseil d'Etat, is said to be a hallmark of
legality. 119 Since administrative decision making characteristically involves
the discretionary application of specially designed rules by persons other
than judges, the need for further analysis is compelling.
117 Supra note 12, at 188.
I'8 Id. at 193 ff.
119 Id. c. 3, esp. at 401 ff.
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Discretion

The juxtaposition of law and discretion was, even to a sympathetic
editor, the feature of Dicey's statement of the rule of law which was "most
difficult to accept.' 20 His antipathy to discretion can be explained on several
grounds: as an outcropping of the common law's earlier contests with the
prerogative, 121 as part of the general preoccupation of nineteenth century
lawyers with the primacy of principle in decision making, 22 or as a more
purposeful effort to deny to government the institutional flexibility needed
to accomplish "collectivist" or "socialist" goals.123 These explanations do
not, however, provide a rationale for contemporary attempts to perpetuate
the law-discretion dichotomy. 24
In contemporary usage, "arbitrariness" is the pejorative equivalent of
discretion, while "policy" is its more benign characterization. In one form
or another, the notion persists of discretion as the antithesis of law, and as
a distinct and characteristic feature of administrative decision-making. The
McRuer Report describes a "hypothetical legal system" without discretion 2
and prescribes, presumably as a realistic measure, the separate treatment of
"administrative" powers in which "the paramount considerations are matters
of policy" as opposed to "judicial" powers which are to be exercised according to the "governing rules of law."' 26 The law of judicial review is much
concerned with distinctions between law and policy, and with the extent to
which discretion is nonreviewable.127 Reformist critics, seeking a more humane
welfare bureaucracy or more vigorous regulatory agencies, seek respectively
120 Wade,

Introduction, supra note 12, at cxxv.
121 Dicey published, without revision and shortly after The Law of the Constitution,
his Arnold Prize Essay of 1860, The Privy Council (London: Macmillan, 1887) in
which he traced the efforts by parliament and the courts to limit the royal prerogative
power. And in The Law of the Constitution, supra note 12, at 202, he also associates
"wide discretionary authority" with "prerogative" and "arbitrariness."
122 Atiyah, From Principlesto Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and Law (Oxford: University Press, 1978).
123 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 115, at 578. The author refers to "the increasing
disposition of those opposed to governmental interference to use the principle of administrative discretion as a whipping post for the revival of a laissez faire policy." Cf.
Jennings, supra note 13, at 55 ff; Friedmann, supra note 13, at 94-95. Support for this
interpretation can certainly be gleaned from Dicey, Introduction to the Second Edition,
supra note 52.
124For an extraordinary portrayal of "14,885 powers" under Canadian federal
statutes "of which 5,938 are judicial, 2,933 administrative, 1,298 investigative and 3,467
rulemaking"-omitting "implicit powers capable of exercise or actually exercised"-see Anisman, A Catalogue of Discretionary Powers in the Revised Statues of Canada
1970 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1975) (Law Reform Commission of Canada) at 23.
Anisman concludes by urging an empirical study of the "actual exercise" of these
powers (at 24), a peculiarly lawyerly way of describing an empirical study of the entire
federal administrative process at work.
'25 Supra note 23, at 18.
1
26 Id. at 28, 54-55.
127 See, e.g., de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3d ed. London:
Stevens, 1973) c. 6; Wade, Administrative Law (4th ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1977)
cc. 11 and 12.
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to judicialize decisional processes that are now discretionary, 28 and to disturb administrative inertia-the nonexercise of discretion-by the invocation
of legal rules.' 9 Even Thompson, the author of a brilliant expos6 of the
manipulation of the Rule of Law, speaks of it as an "unqualified human good"
with potential for "imposing . . . effective inhibitions upon power and the
defence of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims"3 0 -only to be
chidingly reminded that "[i]t undoubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents
power's benevolent exercise."' 31
This tendency to oppose law and discretion, and to link judicial decision
making with the former and administration with the latter, has not gone
unchallenged.
On the one hand, the considerable discretion actually exercised by
judges has come to be much more clearly recognized. Even Dicey was prepared to acknowledge, indeed to applaud, "judicial legislation.' 82 Less
obvious, but no less important, examples of judicial discretion are found in
the exercise of the court's "inherent jurisdiction,"' 83 in fact finding, in sentencing, and in granting access to appeal or review procedures. On the other
hand, a growing body of literature shows that administrative decision-makers

are not only theoretically committed to obeying the law, 3 4 but in fact may
tend to allow discretion to crystallize so completely into rules that they
sometimes cease to function effectively, or at least as originally mandated. 86

Given these perceptions, Dicey's dichotomy between law and discretion
becomes untenable. Davis, in his classic work, Discretionary Justice, dis-

misses Dicey's position as not only "extravagant,"' 186 but "pernicious":

I think the proposition that arbitrary power has no place in our system is pernicious to the extent that it falsifies, and it falsifies to the extent that all modern
governments tolerate a good deal of arbitrary power.37

Davis likewise rejects the distinction drawn by the Franks Committee 8 8 between decisions made "by the application of known principles or laws" and
1s See, e.g., Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Issues
(1965), 74 Yale L.J. 1245.
129 See, e.g., Nonet, Administrative Justice (New York: Russell Sage, 1969).
180 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters-The Origin of the Black Act (New York:
Pantheon, 1975) at 266.
131 Hurwitz, Review, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good? (1977),
86 Yale L.J. 561, at 566.
32
Supra note 52, Lecture XI.
3
1 3 This includes the contempt power, control over court process and procedures,
and supervision of "inferior" tribunals. See Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the
Court, [1970] Curr. L. Prob. 23.
1s4 See, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 13, at 953; Jennings, supra note 13, at 307;
Lederman, supra note 84, at 1167.
235 See, e.g., Farmer, supra note 4, c. 7; Nonet, supra note 129, c. 1.
6
's Davis, supra note 13, at 28 ff.
137 Id. at 29-30.
18 Presumably Davis would also reject the similar analysis in the McRuer Report,
quoted supra note 125.
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"arbitrary" decisions "made without principle, without any rules,"' 39 and
the consequent conclusions "that legal rights may be finally determined only
by regularly constituted courts or that legal rights may be 4finally
determined
0
only through application of previously established rules.'
What, then, is the proper relationship between law and discretion? Davis
defines the problem as finding "the optimum point on the rule-to-discretion
scale,' 41 a task which is said to be inevitable because "[e]very rule involves
some discretion and every discretion involves some limitation.' 42 The balancing of law and discretion involves nice judgments concerning the strategic
and functional costs and benefits of each, as Jowell convincingly demonstrates.' 43 But the important departure from the views of Dicey and Franks
(and McRuer) is not in the precise criteria to be applied in calibrating the
"rule-to-discretion scale"; rather, it is in accepting that the use of such a
scale is not merely inevitable, but constitutionally legitimate in principle.
From this point of departure, it is certainly possible to explore various
techniques for ensuring that administrative discretion is exercised in a manner
which is most consistent with basic democratic values. Davis describes these
as confining, structuring and checking discretion. 4 4 It is clear that primary
responsibility for undertaking the first two of these important tasks must
rest with the legislature which creates and assigns discretion, and with the
administrative tribunal which exercises it. Debate centres on the third. The
right to "check" discretion may, in the final analysis, be the right to exercise
it. As Mitchell reminds us:
Juger 'administration,c'est aussi administrer.Anyone who judges the administration cannot, unless he judges in purely formal and superficial terms, avoid in some
sense, interfering with the administrative process. 145

Various candidates for this sensitive, but crucial, task of "checking"
discretion have been nominated: the courts, an ombudsman, parliament, the
administration itself, even a new-old tribunal, the cabinet, acting through an
"Administrative Committee of the Privy Council."' 46 None of these candidates, except the first, would even remotely approximate the requirements
of Dicey's Rule of Law that the ordinary courts and ordinary law should
ultimately determine the rights of the citizen. 147 Yet not only are all of the
others, singly or in combination, better able than the courts to juger l'administration in light of Mitchell's warning; all of them are also more likely than
the courts to1 48address the substance, rather than the technicalities, of discretion abused.
139Supra note 136, at 29.
140 Id. at 30.
141 Id. at 15.
142

Ganz, Allocation of Decision-Making Function, [1972] Publ. L. 215, at 216.

Jowell, The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion, [1973] Publ. L. 178.
144 Supra note 136, cc. 3-5.

143

145 Supra note 114, at 142; cf. Ganz, supra note 142.
146 Parris, supra note 37, at 312-14.
147 This formulation of the issue deliberately begs the question of whether the

exercise of discretion affects "rights."
148 Mitchell, supra note 40.
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B.

The Generality of Rules
Dicey considered that the Rule of Law demanded that the same legal
rules be applicable to everyone. 1 49 This was a rather curious proposition on
its face. Lord Wright, for example, has observed that "all are equally subject
to the law, though the law as to which some are subject may be different from
the law as to which others are subject,"'u5 a formulation the ironic truth of
which approximates Orwell's "all animals are equal but some are more eqaul
than others." It was particularly curious in light of Dicey's mistrust of discretion. It would seem that any rule which purports to be wide enough to
embrace all persons and circumstances must contain a broad mandate for
the exercise of discretion. Conversely, a broad rule which does not contain
explicit discretionary elements is likely to be applied in a discretionary fashion
so as to produce sensible individualized results. Discretion, in other words,
is the companion of generality; it is made unnecessary only by specificity.
However, Dicey was concerned not so much with the generality of rules
per se as with the unity of the legal system. He insisted that there should be
no "exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law
which governs other citizens."' 51 As to the exemptions of "officials" from
general law, mention has already been made of Dicey's failure to address
the question of crown immunities."' 2 To this may be added the observation
that there are only a very few cases in which officials have been made personally liable for abuse of their positions. 1 3 As to the immunity of "others"-private individuals-Dicey was considerably exercised over immunities conferred by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906, for certain torts committed in the
course of trade disputes. 15 This position is difficult to accept in light of
Dicey's laudatory remarks 5 5 concerning Acts of Indemnity-what else was
the Trade Disputes Act?-and of the well-known fact that the torts themselves were constructed virtually for the sole purpose of regulating union
activity. But public regulation, rather than the immunity of private persons,
is the main focus of this essay.
By asserting the generality of legal rules, Dicey also sought to deny the
existence of administrative law, which was said to be "utterly unknown to the
law of England" and "fundamentally inconsistent with our traditions and
customs."' 56 As he perceived it, the fundamental "notion" of administrative
14 9 Dicey made a curious exception for Acts of Indemnity which "being as it were
the legalisation of illegality are the highest exertion and crowning proof of sovereign
power," supra note 12, at 50. It is difficult to resist the inference which Dicey did not
confront, that Acts of Attainder are similarly to be prized.
150 Quoted in HIeuston, supra note 13, at 47. Cf. Robson, supra note 19, at 466:
'The conception of 'the law of the land' as being a complete and perfect structure ready
to be applied to every controversy immediately it arises is one of those copybook
maxims which one thought had disappeared generations ago."
151 Supra note 12, at 202-03.
152 Supra note 38.
'53 The Canadian locus classicus, Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, has
not been applied more than once or twice in almost twenty years.
15 4 Supra note 52, at xliv.

1-5Quoted supra note 149.
156 Supra note 12, at 203.
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law is "that affairs or disputes in which the government or its servants are
concerned are beyond the sphere of the civil courts,"1157 a notion elsewhere
amplified to embrace the additional proposition that, under administrative
law, officials are "subject in certain respects only to official law administered
by official bodies.' 58 The exclusion of the civil courts will be dealt with
below; our immediate concern is with the application of "official law." The
violation of the Rule of Law is implied by almost any statute which establishes an administrative tribunal with jurisdiction to decide cases according
to "official law"-legal rules and procedures differing from those of the
general law.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to dispel the notion that Dicey
objected only to the application of "official law" to officials, and not to its
application to other persons. This is clear from his references to social insurance, minimum wage, factory and mine safety legislation, in Law and
Public Opinion,159 and from his belated and tentative conclusion that "recent
legislation [including some of the statutes mentioned] is a considerable step
towards the introduction among us of something like the droit administratif
of France."'160 The statutes referred to typically involve officials only as
enforcers of the statutory policy or as judges of its breach; the primary rights
and duties fall upon individual citizens or corporations.
As has been noted,' 6 in Dicey's (and Holdsworth's) view, in the case
of statutes such as these, only ultimate recourse to the courts preserves the
Rule of Law, presumably because it ensures that officials, sitting as a tribunal,
are made to conform not to "official law" but to "ordinary law." But this is
to misunderstand the function and mandate of the courts exercising a reviewing jurisdiction. They can only demand that officials, or a tribunal, conform
to the governing statute. If the statute creates "official law," if it requires
adherence to unusual procedures, and even if it excludes judicial review, the
courts will bow to clearly expressed legislative instructions. Indeed, in overturning the decision of a tribunal, or in affording a remedy against an official,
the courts are in principle executing legislative instructions. For example, a
requirement of natural justice is taken to be part of a legislative directive to
"hear and determine," yielding only to an express contrary indication. "[T]he
common law," it is true, "will supply the omission of the legislature"' 62 by
implying such a requirement even when it is not expressed in the statute. But
in so doing, judges purport to be giving effect to, rather than defying, Parliament's true wishes. In this latter sense, at least, reviewing courts are always
giving effect to "official law."
However, this Jonah-like triumph of "official" over "ordinary" law has
not been apparent to most commentators. It has been argued that the develop167 Id.
158 Id. at 195.
15 9 Supra note 52, xxxii ff.
16 0 Supra note 16, at 152.
16 1 Supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
162 Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, 143 E.R. 414, at 420, per Byles J.
(1863), (C.P.).
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ment of a distinctive English public law has been foreclosed by the historical
circumstances that caused the task of reviewing administrative action to be
assumed by the ordinary courts rather than a senior tribunal within the administration (a Conseil d'Etat or its aborted English equivalent, the Privy
Council) or by Parliament itself.163 Other historical studies stress, however,
that the ordinary courts from an early date had aggressively asserted a jurisdiction to review the decisions of administrative tribunals and officials, as
well as those of other "inferior" courts.' 64 That the assignment of the reviewing function to the regular courts has affected the direction, scope and quality
of review is, however, seldom disputed. It is in the insistence that all law is
ultimately "ordinary," and that "official" or "administrative" law does not
exist, or exists only to the extent tolerated by the general system, that the
results of the institutional arrangements for review are most clearly visible.
Dicey appreciated that to give the last word to the ordinary courts in
the evaluation of administrative action was also to accord their distinctive
legal values 1 5 priority over other values, including governmental effectiveness. Indeed, somewhat disingenuously in light of his antipathy to both "collectivist" legislation and discretion, he acknowledged that
[tihe rigidity of the law constantly hampers (and sometimes with great injury to
the public) the action of the executive, and from the hard-and-fast rules of strict
law, as interpreted by the judges, the government can escape only by obtaining
from Parliament.. . discretionary authority.... 16o

Nor was he alone in this appreciation. Dickinson, an American scholar,
makes a similar point more positively: "The question before us is simply
over how wide a field we desire to cast the net of our legal logic, how inclusive a segment of human relations we wish to congeal into the approximate
stability of a regime of law.' 167 Conceding that this was "simply a question
of policy," the resolution of which depends partly upon the nature of the
matters being regulated, he argues for judicial review not only to provide
"the necessary opportunity for the courts to compel observance of the law
but also as the channel
through which they can carry forward the process
' 8
of legal development."' 1
...

For Dickinson, there are sound functional, as well as historical, reasons
why judges alone can and should develop legal rules relating to administration:
The technical equipment which the [administrative] commissions are supposed to
possess, and the limited and specialized nature of their work, in a measure operate

103 Mitchell, supra note 40.
164 See, e.g., Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1963); Rubinstein, On the Origins of Judicial Review (1964),
2 U.B.C.L. Rev. 1.
165 These he identified elsewhere: "the maintenance of the logic or the symmetry
of the law," "securing the certainty rather than the deficiencies of the law," and advancement of "the ideas of expediency or policy accepted by the Courts [which] may differ
considerably from the ideas which ... guide parliamentary legislation." Supra note 52,
at 364, 366 and 367.
06
1
Supra note 12, at 411.
167 Supra note 46, at 126.
1681d. at 203.
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to unfit them for the task of developing general rules of law. It is of the essence
of legal rules that they should be founded on broader considerations than those
which spring from the special class of situations to which any particular rule may
apply. They must take into account the habits and attitude of mind of the whole
169
community.

But, he cautions, the application of legal rules that are
fixed and empty abstractions ...having no other relation to facts than that of
being clamped down to govern them . . . produces an improper and hurtful
interference with the free and healthy operation of social forces. Arbitrary logic
is as objectionable as anything else that is arbitrary; perhaps more so, since it is
pointed toward nothing real.170

The experience of administrators, he argues, should "form the basis" of the
judge-made law.
Dickinson, like Dicey, might be called a "legalist." He puts the case
for judicial integration of administrative and general law on the basis of
legal principle, and puts it at its highest. He accepts that the general law
must accommodate administrative experience and exigency, as opposed to
the more rigid position of Dicey which virtually insists that the administration
conform to "ordinary" law, whatever the cost in terms of effectiveness. Nonetheless, Dickinson does accept the independent value and ultimate primacy
of general legal rules. It is this "legalist" position which will now be contrasted with two other related positions which may be described as "public
law" and "functionalist".
Both of these positions reject the legalist notion that administrative law
should be integrated within the general legal system. What are the alternatives? The "public lawyers" believe that it is possible and desirable to develop
a coherent and distinctive public law jurisprudence, preferably administered
by special institutions, which reflects the general techniques and traditions
of the legal-administrative system, rather than those of private law. The
"functionalists" are less concerned with developing generalizations about
public law. Rather, they are prepared to allow the specific tasks at hand to
shape the particular legal-administrative response, and to countenance the
emergence of largely autonomous systems in various sectors of administra17
tive activity. 1
The "public law" position has been persistently advanced by Mitchell.
He has pointed out that:
Private law operates between parties who exist in the same plane, and are thus
equal. Rights are in issue. In public law properly conceived there is an inequality;
private right is in conflict with public interest in quite a different way. The mechanisms appropriate to striking a balance in the one condition will of necessity be
inappropriate or inefficient in the other.' 72

The inappropriateness of our procedures for judicial review of the ad169 Id. at 234.

170 Id. at 217.
171 The general issue of legal pluralism will be dealt with in the final section of
this essay.
172 Supra note 40, at 102.
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ministration, of "mechanisms appropriate to striking a balance," in Mitchell's
view, has much to do with out failure to develop a "general concept of administrative morality.' ' 73 We are too concerned with technical regularity,
too little with justice.17 4 And so we are bound to be. General principles of
public law will never develop
except in the right conditions. If these matters are judged as occasional interruptions of the steady stream of private law, then that possibility is denied ....
It
is this denial of consistent thought which has prevented the proper
development
15
of ideas; problems are glimpsed, but solutions are not found. 7

The "right conditions" require the establishment of a specialized public
law jurisdiction.
77 and Friedmann,' 7 8 amongst
The writings of Jennings, 70 RobsonM
others, favour the establishment of such a jurisdiction, and the adumbration
of "unifying principles of public law."'' 17 But what prospects are there for
the emergence of such distinctive and unifying principles? To take only one
example, is it possible or desirable to develop distinctive public law techniques
of statutory interpretation? H. W. R. Wade, making the case in favour of
such techniques, inadvertently illustrates their dangers:

It may be that our system trains lawyers to resist the idea that a rule applied to
the demolition of a house under one Act can govern the dismissal of a chief
constable under another Act, or that the excessive generosity of the Poplar
Borough Council in the 1920s can have a bearing on the validity of purchase tax
regulations in the 1950s. There is a professional antipathy to interpreting one
statute in the light of other quite different statutes. Sensible as this may be, it has
hampered the development of administrative law and extended the "wilderness of
single instances".180

Amongst both "public lawyers" and "functionalists," there is substantial
support for the proposition that common law judges are ill-equipped or unwilling to interpret legislation sympathetically or knowledgeably.'' However,
this is quite a different proposition from the assertion that it is desirable that
"single instances" should be avoided in favour, presumably, of meanings
which are generally understood throughout the entire system of public law.
Why should there be such uniformity? Not all persons interpreting many
laws on a daily basis are lawyers-although uniformity of interpretation would
tend to promote the use of lawyers as advocates and decision-makers. Language may have to be simple, even colloquial, if a statute is to be read easily
by lay people such as welfare benefit claimants, but it may have to be scien173 Id. at 113.
7 4

1

Id. at 106-08.

175 Mitchell, supra note 114, at 146.
170 Jennings, The Report on Ministers' Powers (1934),

10 Pub. Admin. 333;
,4dministrativeAuthorities and the Courts (1935), 17 J. Comp. Leg. Int. L. (3d) 210.
177 See especially supra note 10, c. 6, The Committee on Ministers' Powers, at
426-33 ("The Author's Evidence"), and 623-31.
178 Supra note 13.
179 Id. at 80.
180 Wade, Crossroads in Administrative Law (1968), 21 Curr. L. Prob. 75 at 85.
18 1 See text supra "Making law 'ordinary'."
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tifically precise if it is to regulate the use of nuclear energy, or conceptually
sophisticated if its target is corporate manipulation. Concepts of procedural
fairness likewise fail to yield to useful generalities. The right to confront
one's accuser is a fairly well-accepted feature of natural justice, but should
it prevail if disclosure would render an accuser-for example, an employeevulnerable to reprisal, or would so delay proceedings as to subvert their
purpose-for example, in the case of adulterated food, or when other means
of challenging adverse evidence are employed-for example, scientific testing
of pollution samples?
It is true that, in response to the examples given, higher-order principles
might be proposed: "statutory language is to be construed having regard to
the linguistic skills of those regulated" or "maximum opportunity should be
afforded to those affected to influence decisions, to the extent compatible
with accomplishment of the statutory objective." It is also true that such
principles might be more appropriate in a public law context than their
present common law-influenced counterparts. But principles at this level of
abstraction are hardly legal rules. These are likely to emerge, as the "functionalists" contend, only in the specific and varied contexts of administrative
activity.
Willis, an early advocate of the "functionalist ' position, grasped this
notion, albeit in the context of arguing for special administrative courts, a
"public law" position:
[Who is fitted to interpret a statute which was passed against a certain background
and designed to carry into effect a certain policy? The answer would seem to be,
a person who knows the background and has the means of discovering the policy.
This conclusion rules out the judges of the ordinary courts who know nothing of
the problems of administration and are debarred by the rules of interpretation
from discovering the purposes which the statute is designed to effect .... 182

While an administrative court would, no doubt, come close to meeting Willis'
"functional" test, the logic of his question actually dictates the answer that
the very person charged with administration of the statute is the one most
likely to interpret it properly.
A significant step towards this conclusion is taken by Landis. "A reasonable belief held by the administrative," he proposes, should suffice to give
finality to its interpretation of legislation. 183 Noting a willingness on the part
of courts to defer to expert administrative findings of fact, he suggests that
ca similar impulse should become manifest in the field of law."les
Yet Landis
concedes that ultimately the courts should decide questions of "law."' 85 The
problem, as he perceives it, is to "give some content to the word 'law'."
However, fact and law questions may be intertwined both with each other and
with questions demanding technical expertise, born of experience and observation of specific areas of regulatory activity. How, then, to identify the
"law" questions which are particularly appropriate for ultimate judicial deter182 Supra note 13, at 80.
183 Supra note 13, at 533.

18 4 Id. at 531.
185 Id. at 532.
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mination? The answer, says Landis, is to emphasize "intellectual quality and
discipline as related to a particular problem." This will lead to an identification of "questions that lawyers are equipped to decide."' 86 By "lawyers," of
course, Landis means judges as opposed to administrators; and the "questions"
they can best decide are presumably those which have a minimum content
of context-specific knowledge and a maximum content of general legal principle.
However, this "functionalist" position, which enjoys considerable support187 though not high judicial approval, does no more than suggest a general
approach. Attempts to identify more specifically questions lying within the
competence of lawyers, and thus the province of general law, have not been
altogether successful so far. For example, Hogg suggests that ultimate judicial
control of "general values which are fundamental to the legal order as a
whole,"' 88 would reach as far as insistence that the administrative interpretation of an empowering statute be "reasonable,"' 9 that "invasions of fundamental civil liberties should be authorized by relatively clear language,"' 0°
that the basis of discretion be reasonably related to the purpose of an empowering statute,' 91 that "procedural fairness" should be observed,'1 92 and
that privative clauses be circumvented in "the rare extreme case" where either
193
bona fides or rationality is lacking.
The difficulty with such formulations, in themselves unobjectionable,
is that they launch us down the "slippery slope": 194 terms such as "reasonable," "fair," and "bona fide" are too equivocal; they compel no concessions
to context, although they permit a sympathetic judge to defer to administrative decisions if he wishes. A more rigorously "functionalist" approach would
frame the questions somewhat differently. Are there, for example, elements
of the administrative decision relative to which judges trained in general law
might have special competence not necessarily available to the administration?
Such elements might include the authoritative resolution of constitutional
questions, or the interpretation of statutes, other than the particular one being
administered. Has the administrative agency, by its failure to tender a (credible?) explanation for the adoption of a particular procedure, deprived itself
of the presumptive deference attributable to its special knowledge? One important reason for administrative decision making is the desire to invoke
1861d. at 535-36.
187See, e.g., Davis, 4 Administrative Law Treatise (St. Paul: West Publishing,
1959) s. 28-21; Abel, Appeals against Administrative Decisions (1962), 5 Can. Pub.
Ad. 65; Hogg, Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need?, and Angus, Judicial Review:
Do We Need It? in Baum ed., The Individual and the Bureaucracy (Osgoode Hall Law
School Annual Lecture Series, 1972-73) (Toronto: Carswell, 1973) at 81 and 101;
Jennings, supra note 176, at 216-17; but see contra, Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965).
188 Supra note 187, at 88.
189 Id. at 92.
'90 Id.
'9' Id. at 94-95.
192 Id. at 95-97.
193 Id. at 98.
194 Cf. Weiler, The "Slippery Slope" of Judicial Intervention (1971), 9 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 1.
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procedures which are more appropriate to the subject-matter than those conventionally used in the adversary system. Which procedures are the most
appropriate is, therefore, a question involving knowledge of the subject-matter.
It is "functional" to defer to those possessing such knowledge (if they have,
in fact, considered the matter) rather than to invite the application of adversary-based procedures contemplated by the general law.
In the end, it must be conceded, it is the judges' sensitivity and selfrestraint which will determine where the line is to be drawn between general
rules and specific contexts. What is argued, is that they should be encouraged
to give proper weight to the force of specific context by formulations which
do not either encourage adherence to the general or permit it by an obfuscating vagueness. And the reason for this position is a "functional" one: it
is the administration which is the chosen instrument of public policy, not
the courts; the full range of practical benefits to be derived from that choice
is most likely to be secured if the administration is permitted to solve problems
according to its distinctive norms, rather than those of the courts.1 95
C. Decision-making by Nonjudges
Reverence . . .for the supremacy of law (said Dicey] is seen in its very best
aspect when we recognise it as
being in England at once the cause and the effect
of reverence for our judges. 196

It is necessary to identify the causes of "reverence," as Dicey saw them,
if we are to understand why other persons could not be accorded similar
esteem and responsibilities. These are not fully explored by Dicey. He asserts
that judges, "rather than the government, represent the august dignity of the
state,"' 9 7 but, even if true, this is a conclusion about the locus of reverence
rather than an explanation for it. Nor is understanding much advanced by
such subsidiary observations as the suggestion that the exclusion of extrinsic
evidence in statutory
construction "contributes greatly . . . to the authority
of the judges.' u9 8
An important basis of judicial authority, it would appear, is judicial
independence. On the one hand, judges can be impeached only with difficulty; 9 on the other, they "cannot without considerable danger be turned
° The significance of those facts, in Dicey's
into instruments of government. 200
view, is made clear only in the second edition of Law and Public Opinion,
in which he contrasts administrative tribunals with ordinary courts:
Administrative Courts are always more or less connected with the Government of
the day. Their decisions are apt to be influenced by political considerations. Governmental officials cannot have the thorough independence of judges ....201

195 See Willis, The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values
(1968), 18 U. Toronto L.J. 351.
396 Supra note 12, at 395.
197 Id. at 394.
198 Id. at 408.
'99 Id. at 409-10.
2
0oId.at 395.
2
01 Supra note 52, at xliii.
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No such accusations of political responsiveness or obedience to "collectivist"
government direction, as Dicey had explained in the first edition, could be
made against judges:
They are men advanced in life ...of a conservative disposition... in no way
dependent... upon the favour of the electors, or even of Ministers.... They
are more likely to be biased by professional habits and feeling than by the popular
sentiment of the hour. ...202

Thus the true distinctions between judges and administrators: judges are
independent, administrators are politically responsive; judges are conservative, administrators are "collectivist." If, for Dicey, these distinctions showed
judges in a better light, as an explanation of the "reverence" with which
judges are regarded it leaves something to be desired. Is it really likely that
judges are admired because of either their constitutional position or their
conservatism? Or is it that the very populace to whose sentiments they are
indifferent, if not opposed, respects them for their peculiarly undemocratic
but independent, attitudes? Obviously, not; nor did Dicey explicitly advance
such positions although they are implicit in his analysis.
Rather, the basic premise of Dicey's work, seldom amplified, is that the
respect accorded judges is rooted in a popular belief that they protect personal freedom. In the context of administrative law, Dicey expressed the
belief, no doubt shared by many people, including judges, that "it is probable
that in some form or other the English courts will always find the means for
correcting the injustice, if demonstrated, of any exercise by a Government
department of a judicial or quasi-judicial authority. '20 3
This belief would explain the respect shown to judges. It also helps to
account for their behaviour. Many judges believe that they have the right to
correct administrative injustice "in some form or other" and are, consequently, not always scrupulously careful about which "form." The confused
state of the law relating to such concepts as "jurisdiction" is in part attributable to this lack of care. Moreover, they believe that since they ultimately
exist to provide justice, "injustice" is more likely to result from administrative action than their own. This sometimes leads to a failure to perceive that
"justice" is not a self-defining concept, that it must be related to the standards
and behaviour of the context in which it is applied. 20 4 This failure in turn
occasionally leads judges to do great harm, no doubt inadvertently, to im-

Id. at 364.
0 Supra note 16, at 151.
204Landis, supra note 13, at 525-26 captures the phenomenon: "mhe body of
our law is judge-made and represents the successive reactions to practical situations of
a professional class .... That class has had pride in its handiwork .... But the claim
to pride tends, especially in the hands of lesser men, to a boast of perfection. It is a
rare greatness that recognizes experience as the life of the law. A lesser vision . . .
claims Delphic powers, and rests the learning of the law upon an affinity with deep and
mysterious principles of justice that none but itself can grasp. . . . To admit to the
dispensation of justice other individuals, no matter how wise, who are not bound by
the older disciplines, is regarded with horror." See contra, Lederman, supra note 84,
at 1174: "[Sluperior-court judges, on the whole, are the group of official persons least
likely to seek unduly to expand their own powers...."
202
2 3
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portant public interests. 20 5 And third, at least some judges believe that they
enjoy a popular mandate to prevent "injustice," rather than to undertake the
more limited task of assuring legal and procedural rectitude which is, constitutionally, the province of judicial review. It is this latter belief which is
the most compelling explanation for a judicial attitude of interventionism
toward the administration, yet it is also the most ironic in view of Dicey's
insistence upon the refusal of judges, unlike administrators, to respond to
popular sentiment.
In the final analysis, however, Dicey's argument is circular: the Rule
of Law is "both the cause and the effect" of the esteem for judges; judges
are respected because they administer the Rule of Law which they are able
to do because they are esteemed. This analysis provides no useful yardstick
by which the relative merits of judges and administrators can be measured.
One such yardstick might involve an assessment of the personal qualities
of the two groups. Judges, as a group, no doubt overshadow administrators
as a group. They are probably better educated, doubtless know more about
law in general (although not necessarily about particular fields of law), and
are almost certainly better paid. Judges enjoy greater prestige, at least in part
because they are relatively few in number; they personify a tradition of great
antiquity which is reinforced by both symbols of power and its actual manifestations, such as the right to suppress undue criticism by penal sanctions.
They are the elite of a group which enjoys personal and professional contacts
with powerful forces in society, but they are insulated by tenure and by traditions-some would argue myths--of neutrality and objectivity from the tensions and resentments of political conflict.
Administrators, on the other hand, are a much larger and more heterogeneous group. Their talents are as diverse as their training, their prestige as
tenuous as their claim to professional status is recent.20 6 They often, but not
necessarily, know a good deal about the particular legal rules which they
administer, but are less likely to have general legal knowledge; they are,
typically, presumed to bring other types of expert knowledge to their work
but, especially in hierarchically-organized, high-volume tribunal systems, this
presumption is strained. Unlike judges, administrators do not enjoy cQnstitutional immunity from either ministerial direction or dismissal, although in
practice they may be accorded both autonomy within established lines of
policy and relative security of employment. 207 And finally, administrators

205 E.g., a court's narrow construction of planning legislation may overturn a municipal decision to forbid or to postpone a sizeable building development; as a result, the
development proceeds, with ramifying consequences for municipal services, traffic
patterns, commercial development etc.; and the "new" meaning attached by the court
to the statute may produce a chain-reaction involving other pending developments,
before it is revised (or restored to what had been previously understood) by corrective
legislation.
20
6 See generally Parris, supra note 37, c. 5; Perkin, The Origins of Modern English
Society 1780-1880 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972) at 319 ff., 'The Professionalization of Government."
207 See Farmer, supra note 4, at 185.
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tend to work in areas of social conflict and ideological sensitivity; as the personification of controversial or unpopular policies, they attract resentment and
disparagement which they cannot suppress, as judges can, by recourse to
prestige or the contempt power.
Judges as a group, then, do compare favourably with administrators.
However, in given situations the personal characteristics of the administrator
may be virtually indistinguishable from those of a judge. Members of some
senior tribunals, for example, may be legal experts or compensate for lack
of such expertise by other intellectual credentials, and for their lack of tradition-based prestige by that accorded those responsible for major decisions
affecting the community. A true comparison of like with like, it might be
argued, would measure judges against this elite of tribunal members. Indeed,
the whole basis of the comparison is called into question by the fact that some
tribunals are presided over by judges.
It is instructive, moreover, to consider that both elite groups, judges and
administrators, have, at various recent times and in varying degrees, come
under attack for rather similar reasons. The courts, it has been alleged, are
excessively protective of private business interests; they have been accused
of undermining public policies relating to collective bargaining and the maintenance of business competition. The senior administrative agencies, on the
other hand, are said to have been "captured" by the very interests they were
established to regulate; this charge is made with special force in rate fixing,
transportation and communications matters.
Both groups have been castigated particularly for their failure to maintain a high standard of justice at the lowest levels of their respective hierarchies. Small claims courts and magistrates' courts have been the object of
academic and editorial condemnation; welfare, workmen's compensation and
immigration officials at lower and middle levels especially have sometimes
been shown to exhibit equal insensitivity to humane and democratic values.
This is not the occasion to rehearse the literature of criticism, or to
attempt definitively to evaluate it, but several tentative observations must be
made. All governmental institutions, including the courts, are under critical
scrutiny. Charges of venality, of deliberate dereliction of duty, of conscious
bias or knowing disregard of law or procedure are made relatively rarely.
The telling burden of much criticism relates to recruitment, remuneration,
training and deployment of personnel, to mixed, unclear or contradictory
government policies, to institutional design flaws, or to the nonamenability of
conduct to the prescribed (or even any) judicial or administrative arrangements. This litany suggest no obvious reason to prefer judges over administrators.
Even if it were conceded that judges are both in an objective sense,
and in public perception, more qualified and prestigious than administrators,
the Rule of Law argument in favour of ultimate judicial decision of all matters
involving rights is not advanced. There are simply more matters to be decided
than an inelastic supply of judges could cope with, and those matters involve
so many issues other than legal rights that judicial talent would be misspent
in trying to resolve them. These considerations of multiplicity and diversity

1979]

Rethinking Administrative Law

would soon destroy the very bases of judicial preeminence. Recourse to administrative decision making is thus inevitable.
But it is more than inevitable. It is, in the view of almost all modem
governments, desirable. How and why, in light of the undeniable merits of
the judiciary, governments have reached this conclusion is what is at issue.
And the issue will not be resolved by either Dicey's circular reasoning or
ad hominem analysis. It will turn upon identification of the attractive characteristics of administrative decision making, and the articulation of criteria
for weighing these against judicial disposition.
In part, the issues are the same as those explored in the discussion of
the generality of rules. To some extent, the desired content of rules dictates
the choice of the particular forum in which they are to be applied. If the
rules are conventional rules of common law, there is good reason to choose
the ordinary courts as the forum for their enforcement. If the rules have a
significant content of social policy or commercial custom, then the forum
should be one whose members are familiar with and sensitive to the relevant
policy or custom. The decider, in other words, is selected in each case in order
to function as an effective vehicle for the norms of decision. This is not to
deny the possibility that intelligent decision-makers can transcend their own
credentials. Indeed, sometimes they must do so because their mixed functions
require it; sometimes they will do so out of a misconceived desire, conscious
or unconscious, to compensate for their own lack of skill or knowledge. 208
Nonetheless, the very decision to select as a decision-maker someone with
particular experience or knowledge creates at least a presumption that that
person was selected because those qualities are relevant to the process of
decision.
There is much more involved in the choice of a forum than the credentials of its members, or the norms governing its decisions, however. Indeed,
the very use of terms such as "forum," "norm" and "decision" points the way
towards further areas of exploration. These terms all assume that matters
will be disposed of by adjudication, but even Dicey hinted at the possibility
that governmental processes might have to resemble "the management of a
business" rather than "the conduct of a trial."'209 This analogy hardly exhausts

the possibilities. Administrative tribunals are not necessarily courts writ small,
any more than courts in the exercise of their reviewing function are merely
administrative tribunals writ large.
The tendency to assume an identity of functions between courts and
tribunals is perhaps understandable for historical reasons. Until the mid-nineteenth century, in the absence of a centralized bureaucracy, "[a]dministrative
action was.., taken under a judicial form." 210 Second, the tribunal perform208 The highly legalistic lay administrator, the "barrack-room" or "sea-lawyer,"
illustrates this phenomenon.
209
Supra note 16, at 150.
210 Watson, The Reign of George III (Oxford: University Press, 1960) at 45,
quoted in Abel-Smith and Stevens, Lmvyers and the Courts (London: Heinemann, 1967)
at 9. Cf. Landis, supra note 13, at 525-26; Webb and Webb, English Local Government,
supra note 76, c. 7, and The Manor and the Borough, c. 7 (1908).
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ing adjudicative functions became a familiar, if not archetypal, form of administrative organization in England.2 1 1 The multifaceted regulatory commissions, more characteristic of North American jurisdictions, were less frequently utilized in England where public ownership or departmental control
were preferred methods of safeguarding major community interests. 212 There
was thus, perhaps, less need to emphasize the differences between judicial
and administrative processes. Third, the fact that judges were responsible for
reviewing administrative conduct may have resulted in a tendency to tell administrators "do as we do" as well as "do as we say." And, finally, the
persistence of Dicey's Rule of Law thesis, imbedded in the culture and consciousness of lawyers, judges and administrators and revivified by the Committee on Ministers' Powers and the Franks Committee in England, and the
McRuer Commission in Canada, has produced predictable results. The structuring and staffing of tribunals, the specification of their functions and procedures, and the provision of broad rights of appeal are moulding tribunals
which tend to be more court-like. Life is coming to resemble art.
But for all that some tribunals do resemble courts in important ways,
not all tribunals resemble courts in all ways. Nor, it is urged, should they.
It is to an appreciation of their differences that we must now turn.
It has been suggested that tribunals might be characterized as either
"court-substitute" or "policy-oriented, ' 21 3 a dichotomy that has been questioned because it fails to reflect the existence of "an infinite variety of tribunals, whether looked at from a functional, operational or constitutional
point of view. ' 214 Thus, while the sole task of some tribunals is adjudication,
other tribunals perform quite different tasks, with or without an admixture
of adjudication: the enactment of regulations or the propounding of a scheme;
investigation, report, and the formulation of advice or recommendations to
the public, a government department, or parliament; mediation and consensus-seeking as a means of dispute settlement or as a prelude to official
action; conferral of benefits or imposition of detriments-and the list is not
exhaustive. 215
To the extent that adjudication is a tribunal's sole or major function, it
might perhaps be described as a "court-substitute" tribunal. It would be a
mistake, however, to assume too readily that it does, or should, resemble a
court beyond the mutual involvement of both in the exercise of finding facts
and evaluating them according to more or less predetermined norms. Reference has already been made to the different normative systems used by courts
and tribunals to decide cases, and to the resultant differences in the qualifica2 11

See Roberts, supra note 74; Farmer, supra note 4; and Elcock, Administrative
Justice (London: Longmans, Green, 1969).
212 Schwartz and Wade, Legal Control of Government-Administrative Law in
Britain and the United States (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972) at 37-38. This is a point of
great importance in considering the possible application of English administrative law
theory and of English judicial review doctrines in Canada, see Willis, Canadian Administrative Law in Retrospect (1974), 24 U. Toronto L.J. 255 at 230.
213 Abel-Smith and Stevens, In Search of Justice (London: Penguin, 1968) c. 7.
214 Farmer, supra note 4, at 184.
215 See, e.g., Ganz, Administrative Procedure (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1974).
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tions of decision-makers, but tribunals may differ from courts in other ways,
even when both purport to be adjudicating.
Amongst the potentially distinctive features of tribunal adjudication are
the following: the allocation of responsibility as between the parties and the
tribunal for presenting facts and arguments; the question of standing and the
right of nonparties to participate; procedures for defining issues and the consequences of procedural lapses; the corporate nature of tribunal decisions
which rely upon staff to gather, present or evaluate facts or to prepare draft
or recommended decisions; the scope and nature of evidence, including questions of relevance, admissibility and official notice; the range of remedies or
results available; the caseload and its consequences in terms of method of
presentation, use of low-level adjudicators and diversion into non-adjudicative
processes; formality and professionalism in presentation; and. the admixture
in decision making of elements of scientific or technical judgment, compromise, rule promulgation, or public education, as well as norm application.
Within the expanded frame of reference implied by this description of
administrative activity, even of administrative adjudication, it is easy to understand why governments might prefer to assign many tasks to persons other
than judges.
One more point must be made, however. The decision to commit matters
to an administrative tribunal does not simply reflect a desire to gain the benefit
of special techniques and talents. It suggests, as well, a determination that
judges should not be involved. Sometimes that determination is made against
the background of unhappy experience with judicial handling of those matters.
Sometimes it is made when the legislature moves into a new field and decides
at the outset not to involve the courts. In either case, the avoidance of the
courts as tribunals of first instance raises two questions about their role as
instruments of review and appeal.
First, assuming the principle that tribunals and courts should be allocated
tasks within their respective areas of competence, is it possible to disaggregate
legal from other issues, so as to reserve the former for ultimate decision by
the courts? Some questions which may assume a legal form will clearly intrude
upon the special competence of the tribunal. For example, a reviewing court
which decides upon the sufficiency or admissibility of evidence or the appropriateness of policy adopted by the tribunal, will almost certainly be substituting its inexpert judgment for that of a relatively expert tribunal. Such
intervention is inconsistent with the initial decision to give matters to a
tribunal.
Other questions may involve the application of general legal standards,
such as natural justice, within the context of a particular field of activity.
Here, the least that can be said is that the tribunal should be presumed to be
responding to the exigencies of the context, unless there is persuasive evidence
to the contrary. Questions such as the adequacy of notice, for example, should
prima facie, if not conclusively, abide the tribunal's judgment. Whether notice
of a hearing should be given personally or by public advertisement may turn
on the potential number of interested persons, and the likelihood of their being
alerted by the means adopted. The length of notice prior to hearing may

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 17, NO. 1

involve balance of convenience considerations, as between one interest which
seeks speedy relief, and another which needs adequate time to make an effective response. These and like matters do not yield to legal generalizations;
they have significance only in the practical realities with which the tribunal
is most familiar. By contrast, bias would be an appropriate question for a
reviewing court, both because detachment is desired on such an issue particularly, and because context is unlikely to be relevant.
A third category of questions involves the court's right to interpret the
statute under which the tribunal is operating, or to decide whether some other
substantive legal rule should be applied by the tribunal. Here, the issues
presented have already been canvassed in the context of the discussion of
whether autonomous legal systems should be permitted to exist. In brief, the
words of the empowering statute are necessarily so interwoven with its policy,
so likely to be properly understood only in terms of the results of alternative
interpretations, that the argument for ultimate decision by the tribunal is
strong indeed. However, the constitutional implications of some errors are
profund: a tribunal should not be allowed to trespass upon the jurisdiction
of another body or to act in a manner wholly beyond the contemplation of
its charter. Court intervention in such cases should be reserved for cases that
are so wholly devoid of special contextual influences that no rational tribunal,
acting in good faith, could possibly import them into its determination.
A second general question relating to review and appeal flows from the
first. Assuming that the question before the reviewing court clearly falls within
its area of competence and outside of that of the tribunal, are the costs of
court intervention excessive? These costs may be the obvious ones of time
and money. An appeal that has the effect of staying an administrative decision may make its ultimate implementation futile, or confront the beneficiary
of the determination with expenses that would exceed his potential gain.
To allow an appeal in such circumstances may be to frustrate the very purpose
of the statute.
There are other, less obvious costs, as well. The future prospect of
review, especially if it stems from several unhappy experiences in the past,
may cast a long shadow over the work of a tribunal. Substantive decisions
may be taken with an eye to whether they will pass judicial muster, rather
than to whether they advance the policies of the statute to maximum effect
within the boundaries of rational interpretation. Nonadjudicative powers of
the tribunal may fall into disuse because of its preoccupation with meeting
judicially acceptable standards of decision making.210 Judicial review tends to
justify, if not exacerbate, the natural propensity towards caution and restraint
which afflicts most tribunals, at least after an initial period of activism. This
effect is particularly undesirable if there are great discrepancies in the ability
of the "clients" of the tribunal to invoke or resist judicial review, a potentially
expensive business.
210

Cf. Nonet, supra note 129, esp. c. 9, "Legal Development and Institutional
Changes"; and Wade, Towards Administrative Justice (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1963) at 47: "....

virtually all the main independent agencies ...

have got

bogged down in their judicial procedures and have tended to neglect policy making...

."
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Thus, it is by no means clear that even the minimal role assigned to a
reviewing court on the basis of its special legal skills can be undertaken without serious detriment to the functioning of the tribunal itself. Is this detriment
offset by important advantages?
The putative advantages of judicial review can be shortly stated. First,
determination in the superior courts of all legal issues may be seen as a
distinct constitutional good needing no special justification. As has been
suggested, this position is difficult to support on historical grounds. Second,
judicial review protects individual citizens against official oppression. No
doubt, this is generally true, but it is by no means inevitable that in any given
instance of judicial intervention the individual benefitted actually was treated
illegally217 or, for that matter, that deserving individuals were not denied
relief. 218 The medium of intervention is a vocabulary of elastic concepts, and
judges often lack adequate appreciation of context to mould them into an
appropriate instrument for gauging either administrative procedures, or a
tribunal's invocation of statutory powers or other legal rules. It is difficult to
have confidence in the correctness of judicial decisions, given these serious
limitations. Third, judicial review helps to integrate the legal system by assuring that principles of administrative law and modes of administrative operation are consistent with those generally prevailing. But this integrative treatment of the system may be precisely contrary to the wishes of those who have
constructed it. They wanted a special administrative regime; that is why the
task at hand was not given to, or was taken away from, the courts. 219 Finally,
it is urged that the very possibility of judicial review encourages tribunals to
behave properly. No doubt, it is occasionally true that tribunals deliberately
do things which they know to be improper or illegal; and it is even conceivable
that they may do so after calculating the chances of being reviewed. But it is
unlikely. Judicial review, seen as general deterrence, is a less promising method of securing proper administrative decisions at first instance than a host of
other methods: ensuring openness and opportunities for participation to those
affected by decisions, recruitment and training of tribunal members, provision
of more explicit administrative and legislative instructions, and establishment
of internal administrative review procedures-to name but a few. 22 0

217 This is not only a statistical possibility in any court staffed by mere mortals; it
is a realistic probability insofar as judicial decisions reversing well-established interpretations of administrative statutes or regulations are themselves often set aside by legislation restoring the original interpretation.
218 See Mitchell, supra note 40, esp. at 106-07.
219 The force of this particular argument is obviously diminished where parliament
has enacted special arrangements for judicial review. Even here, however, the statute
may reflect compromises, for example, between administrators and "experts" who seek
to preserve the distinctiveness and autonomy of tribunals, on the one hand, and those
who place a higher premium on legal regularity, e.g., legislative draftsmen, or who sense

that judicial review will offer them tactical advantages, e.g., opponents of regulation,
on the other.
220 Cf. Heuston, supra note 13, at 166: "[Allthough one way of securing correct
decisions is to give a right of appeal, a better way is to ensure that the tribunal in
question is composed of sound judges and follows a good procedure." And at 170-71:
"The true method of control of many administrative powers is on the floor of the House
of Commons and not in the law courts."
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Judicial review has only a limited useful role: checking the presumptive
validity of administrative decision making, especially where the special skills
of the administrative tribunal or the special significance of context are of
minimal importance; and dealing with allegations that the tribunal has acted
with bias, bad faith, total irrationality, or in an area lying quite beyond its
competence.
Acceptance of this limited role for judicial review necessarily implies
that much of what tribunals do or decide will not be reviewable, and that, in
any event, departure from traditional legal rules will not, per se, be grounds
for judicial intervention. In such a context, it can be anticipated that there
will be ample opportunity for the growth of distinctive legal systems whose
norms, procedures and personnel will often not resemble those of the general
legal system. Such a situation can be fairly described as pluralism.
V.

CONCLUSION
Mention of "pluralism" reminds us that there is nothing less at issue in
our analysis of administrative law than an inquiry into the nature of the legal
system itself.221 A mere agenda of relevant questions suggests the broad scope
of such an inquiry: Do we have a homogeneous and integrated legal system or
a pluralistic one? If pluralistic, are the particular component systems constitutionally autonomous or do they exist by let and tolerance of the general
system? What are the implications of each possibility for both the central or
general system and the special purpose components? Assuming a pluralistic
system, in which administrative law in fact enjoys considerable autonomy,
how should its distinctive "law" develop in order to preserve basic democratic
values? Assuming, even under pluralism, that some degree of external accountability is inevitable, to whom and in respect of what should the administration
account?
These questions amount to the prospectus for another essay. They relate, moreover, not merely to administrative law, but to all the other public
and private special purpose components that may exist: specialized courts
such as the juvenile and family courts, commercial arbitration systems and
professional tribunals, the adjudicative bodies of some ethnic and religious
communities, and informal, neighbourhood forums for dispute resolution. It
is sufficient for present purposes to acknowledge, however, that in a peculiar
and ironic way Lord Hewart may have been right: The Rule of Law does
assume a different vision of the legal system than does administrative law.
But in another sense he was wrong: What divides these visions of law is not
a fundamental disagreement over the relevance of such basic values as procedural fairness, adherence to appropriate normative rules, or accountability;
rather, the source, meaning and practical implementation of these values
are the focus for debate.
A number of important recent studies of administrative law have warned
221 See Hooker, supra note 80, esp. at 1-2. Despite his preoccupation with colonial
situations, Hooker argues that "even within developed nations themselves, there are
signs that a plurality of law is no longer regarded with quite the abhorrence common
a decade ago."
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concerns. By viewing law as a more complex and highly differentiated phenomenon than we have tended to do, it may be possible to identify its existence,
and promote its presence, in places and by procedures which differ from those
of conventional legal analysis and prescription.
Specifically, it is urged that within the general framework of governing
legislation-no case is made for parthenogenesis-the administration does
have, and should have, the power to create law. Sometimes this "law" will
result from the exercise of express powers to adjudicate or to enact subordinate legislation. Sometimes it will be customary law emerging from patterns of
discretionary decisions, manuals and codes, agreements and understandings.
Its effectiveness will rest not only upon threats of formal sanctions, but upon
persuasion and compromise, consultation and consensus seeking, conferral of
benefits and withholding of favours.22
The challenge will be to infuse this "unordinary" administrative law
making and law enforcing with the same fundamental values which we prize
in our general legal system. Some observers regard this as an intrinsically
impossible task.22 4 We have, however, come increasingly to understand on the
one hand, for example, that formal adjudication may not be institutionally
appropriate for certain kinds of disputes. 22 5 And, on the other hand, we have
begun to uncover traces of legal values even in procedures, such as negotiation, which were thought to be their antithesis. 2 0 Perhaps the moment has
arrived for reconsidering not only what our legal system is, but how its
essential values may best be promoted within the administration.
Is this exercise not, in fact, inevitable? Can we really accept that the
modern state must either confine its activities to those which can be undertaken consistently with the traditional Rule of Law or that we must sacrifice
the basic democratic and legal values which the Rule of Law, however inappropriately, seeks to protect in order effectively to pursue democratically
determined goals?
Essentially, this essay has sought to distinguish Law--"Rule of" variety
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See generally, Winkler, Law, State and Economy: The Industry Act 1975 in
Context (1975), 2 Br. J. L. & Soc. 103; Unger, supra note 47, loc. cit.; Daintith, Public
Law and Economic Policy, [1974 J.Bus. L. 9; Mitchell, The Constitutional Implications
of Judicial Control of the Administration in the United Kingdom, [1967] Camb. LJ.46,
esp. at 57 ff.
223 Farmer, supra note 4, at 198, predicts that such processes "will provide the basis
for administrative law in the latter quarter of the twentieth century".
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Unger, supra note 47.
22r Cf. Fuller's well-known, but unpublished, paper The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication suggesting the impossibility of adjudicating "polycentric" problems; and
see also Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, [1963] Wisc. L. Rev. 3 and
Jowell, supra note 143, at 213-15.
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oEisenberg, Private Ordering through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking (1976), 89 Harv. L.Rev. 637; but cf. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions (1971), 44 S. Cal. L. Rev. 305, esp. at 328 ff.
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-from law-"administrative" variety-in the conviction that the latter, much
more than the former, is capable of vindicating essential democratic values
in a modern state. It is true that some particular proposals, such as the considerable restraint on judicial review, may be seen as potentially depriving
aggrieved individuals of recourse, but this is to assess the proposals only in
terms of pathology.
Constructive measures to enhance the original quality of decisions will
not result in perfection, but they will, in the aggregate, ensure greater justice
for more people than could possibly benefit from any system of judicial review.
Such measures would include clearer statements of legislative purpose, better
defined and more open procedures to ensure participation, more careful training of administrative decision-makers, systems of internal appeal, and external, but largely nonjudicial, accountability.
In matters of policy formulation and institutional design, the legislature
should clearly have, and periodically utter, the last word. Assessments of
administrative professionalism and performance (including excessive zeal and
sloth) should be confided to higher administrative bodies, and ultimately to
authorities who are politically accountable. Remedies for patent injustice and
violations of administrative law should be sought from a senior administrative
tribunal or, in its absence, an ombudsman.
What, then, of judicial review? I suggest that the focus of judicial review
should shift to more authentic concerns from its present preoccupation with
commanding adherence to "ordinary" law, often couched in the spurious
language of "jurisdiction" and "error of law" and analogies to traditional
court practices misdescribed as "natural justice." There are three main functions for judicial review: ensuring that tribunals (and other bodies) perform
tasks of the sort generically confided in them, protecting transcendent constitutional values, and enforcing fidelity to the distinctive "law" of the tribunal. Each of these functions resembles present concerns of reviewing judges,
but the intended differences must be made clear.
By confining tribunals to their assigned tasks, I do not mean to invite
the over-nice distinctions by which courts reach the substance of administrative decisions through tortured definitions of jurisdiction "declined" or "exceeded" and questions not asked or answered, or wrongly asked or answered.
A tribunal should be understood to possess "jurisdiction" to perform any
work arguably connected with the subject matter assigned to it.
In the method of performing that work, tribunals should respect transcendent constitutional values. These values are, for example, "meaningful
participation" rather than the "right to cross-examine" or even "the right to
be heard" and "like treatment of like cases," rather than "abuse of discretion" or "ultra vires." To be sure, this still leaves a margin of interpretation
and judgment: what participation is "meaningful," what cases are "like"?
Here a reviewing court should be seeking and assessing rational and bona fide
explanations of the tribunal's conduct, deferring to its assessment of the context in which it operates, rather than imposing preconceived judicial notions
derived from other contexts. Only when rationality and bona ides are lacking
should the constitutional standard be found to be violated.
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"Error of law" should remain as a basis for judicial review, but "law"
should be reinterpreted to mean the 'law of the forum," not the "ordinary"
law otherwise administered by the court. Here again, the reviewing court
should be seeking explanations, supporting distinctive but sensible systems of
rules, acknowledging that modes of thinking, fact gathering, or rule promulgation are not "illegal" because they are "unordinary." But a court will advance
the fundamental virtues of legality if it holds the administration to the law it
has chosen to define for itself. These considerations, of course, assume that
the tribunal can be taken to be exercising its special skills and experience; its
collateral and casual interpretation of "ordinary" legal rules which lie beyond
these boundaries deserves much less deference.
To the extent that these reviewing functions are not performed elsewhere
in the legal system, they will undoubtedly be undertaken, as judicial review
now is, by superior courts of general jurisdiction. No doubt, the first and
second functions will always be performed by such courts, while the third is
already, in certain fields, the work of specialized administrative appeal tribunals. Any change in the overall structure of judicial review depends, of
course, on legislation-and present legislative trends are, as I have suggested,
much influenced by Rule of Law thinking-but changes in the mood and
scope of judicial review do not.
Within the framework of present arrangements, without even serious
departure from the familiar vocabulary of the present law of judicial review,
it is possible for judges to redefine their own role vis-t-vis the administration.
Specifically, there is no reason why they should not give full recognition to
the distinctive legal systems which have emerged in various administrative
tribunals, no reason why they should not abandon the effort to evaluate these
distinctive systems according to the inappropriate criteria of "ordinary" law.
If they did so, they would not merely be acknowledging the reality of pluralism, which seems always to have been an important feature of the English
legal system. They would, as well, be promoting the development of an authentic, indigenous administrative law, which is the citizen's best protection
against abuse.

